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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a family of eight riding along on the freeway in a van. Out of
nowhere, a drunk driver crashes into the van causing injury to all the family
members. Upon determining that the federal court is the fairest forum, the
family decides to bring suit in federal court. Each claim of each family
member is joined in one action under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.2 The family claims that the federal court has diversity subject
matter jurisdiction over the claims of the family members.
A federal court has jurisdiction over a case based on diversity
jurisdiction when the diversity of citizenship and amount-in-controversy
requirements have been met.3 Diversity of citizenship is not a problem
because the drunk driver is a citizen of a different state than that of all the
family members in the van. 4  The current amount-in-controversy
requirement is that the "matter in controversy [must] exceed[] the sum or
value of $75,000."5 One family member, a young girl left comatose by the
accident, has damages totaling $2,000,000. The other seven members have
damages equaling $60,000 each. The family members figure that they must
have met the amount-in-controversy requirement because, among the eight
of them, they have a $2,420,000 claim, well above the $75,000 mark.
To the surprise of the family, the lone defendant files a 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.6 In his motion, the
defendant cites Zahn v. International Paper Co. 7 and Clark v. Paul Gray,
Inc.,8 Supreme Court cases which state that each and every claim must meet
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000); see also Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation: Plagued
By Concerns Over Federalism, Jurisdiction and Fairness, 37 AKRON L. REv. 589, 595 n.25 (2004).
The diversity requirement has long been understood to require "complete diversity," meaning that
"no defendant can be a citizen of the same state as any plaintiff." Id.
4. See, e.g., Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
7. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
8. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
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the amount-in-controversy requirement independently and, therefore, all but
the girl's claim must be dismissed from federal court.
The family is distraught. They want the girl to have the fairest trial she
can get, which is in federal court. However, due to her vulnerable and minor
status the comatose girl is not in a condition to pursue her claim on her own.
Therefore, unless the family decides to voluntarily dismiss the girl's claim,
and include her claim with the rest of the family in state court, they will be
faced with the complex and expensive consequence of pursuing two separate
cases in two different judicial systems. Looking for a way out, the family
argues that the supplemental jurisdiction statute, which allows
jurisdictionally insufficient claims to attach to the jurisdiction of
independently sufficient claims, allows the federal court to exercise
jurisdiction over the $60,000 claims because the girl's claim meets the
amount-in-controversy requirement. 9
How will the district court rule? Will it rule in favor of the defendant or
for the plaintiffs?
Prior to Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.,' ° the answer
would have depended on which federal circuit the district court found itself
in. About half of the circuit courts held that the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, overruled Zahn and Clark, thereby allowing all of
the family claims to be brought in district court."l The other half held that §
1367 left the holdings of Zahn and Clark as good law, requiring the
dismissal of the family members' claims, other than that of the girl. '
2
The majority in Exxon Mobil found the statute to be unambiguous and
determined that § 1367, in effect, overruled Zahn and Clark and held that
when one claim meets both requirements of diversity jurisdiction a federal
court could have supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs joined under Rule
20 or 23 who did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.1 3  In
their dissents, both Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg agreed with the
9. Loosely based on the facts in Ortega v. Star Kist Foods, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 84, 85-87
(D.P.R. 2002).
10. 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
11. See In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press
Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001).
Although in this hypothetical the plaintiffs are joined under Rule 20, Zahn and Clark also prevents
district courts from exercising jurisdiction over class action plaintiffs under Rule 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure who do not individually meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
12. See Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998); Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999); Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir.
2000).
13. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 566.
circuit courts that found the language ambiguous and that § 1367 preserved
the holdings in Zahn and Clark.14  In the end, however, the majority's
textualist approach prevailed. 5
Is Congress, the body that passed § 1367, made up of civil procedure
radicals? Some legal scholars and Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. would lead one to believe that the
majority's decision makes such an assertion. 16
This note will analyze the various opinions in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services, Inc. 17  Part II will be a brief history of diversity
jurisdiction and amount-in-controversy jurisprudence, including amount-in-
controversy jurisprudence that developed in general federal-question
jurisdiction cases. Part III will explore the development of ancillary and
pendent jurisdiction. Part IV will discuss the creation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
the reaction to the legislation by legal scholars and interpretations by the
courts. Part V will analyze the Court's decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services, Inc. Part VI will discuss the ramifications and the
effect of the Court's holding.
II. HISTORY OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION & THE AMOUNT-IN-
CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT
Diversity jurisdiction is authorized by the United States Constitution and
was first implemented by Congress through the 1789 Judiciary Act.' 8 The
14. Id. at 575-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (implying that the assertion that Congress would
"attempt to overrule (without discussion) two longstanding features of this Court's diversity
jurisprudence" was unrealistic); id. at 583-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing to the fact that the
House Committee on the Judiciary Report listed the proposed change as "modest" and
"noncontroversial" as evidence that the Court's interpretation of § 1367 should be "one less
disruptive of our jurisprudence regarding supplemental jurisdiction").
15. Id. at 572.
16. James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for a Sympathetic
Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 109 (1999). The author makes a case for so-called sympathetic
textualism. The author places great emphasis on the legislative history that calls the legislation
implementing 28 U.S.C. § 1367 "noncontroversial." See also House Report No. 101-734, as
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6862; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas
M. Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to
Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 960-61 n.90 (1991) (rebutting Professor Freer's assertion that
28 U.S.C. § 1367 would lead to "ridiculous" results such as overturning Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) by pointing to the legislative history and looking forward to the fact that in
a future Supreme Court case Justice Scalia, an avowed textualist, will have to use the legislative
history or come to the impliedly controversial conclusion "that section 1367 ... wipe[s] Zahn off the
books"); Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 579 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (implying that the majority's
interpretation is more "disruptive of [Supreme Court] jurisprudence).
17. 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
18. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 39 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC Report];
see also Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles, " 78 VA. L. REv. 1769, 1800
(1992) (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis of the Constitutional requirements for diversity
838
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constitutional requirement for a federal court to have diversity jurisdiction
has been determined by the Supreme Court to be what is called "minimal
diversity."1 9 However, very early in the Court's history it was determined
that the "complete diversity" requirement applied whenever Congress
implemented diversity jurisdiction through language similar to that used in
the 1789 Judiciary Act.20 The first Congress also attempted "[t]o limit
federal court intrusion into everyday lawsuits [by] establish[ing] a
jurisdictional minimum of $500."2 1 Currently, the amount-in-controversy
requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) is
"where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interests and costs ....2
jurisdiction under Article 1II). Although there is little written history on the matter, the majority of
legal scholars agree that diversity jurisdiction was created by the Framers of the Constitution and
enacted by Congress "based on a fear that State courts would be biased or prejudiced against those
from out of State." STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 192 (6th ed. 2004) (quoting
ABOLITION OF DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION, H.R. REP. No. 893 (1978)).
19. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). The Court in State
Farm upheld Congress' grant of jurisdiction in interpleader causes of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1335
(2000). The Court determined that all that was required under the Constitution for a federal court to
have diversity jurisdiction was "minimal diversity." State Farm, 386 U.S. at 530. The Court
defined "minimal diversity" as a cause of action in which there is "diversity of citizenship between
two or more claimants, without regard to the circumstance that other rival claimants may be
cocitizens." Id. (footnote omitted).
20. Id. at 530-31 (explaining that Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)
established that "complete diversity" was required under federal diversity jurisdiction statute, which
means that "where co-citizens appear[] on both sides of a dispute jurisdiction [is] lost").
Additionally, the Court strengthened its argument that the Constitution did not require "complete
diversity" even though the words of the 1789 Judiciary Act and Article Ill of the Constitution
regarding diversity jurisdiction are very similar, because Chief Justice Marshall did not say that he
was interpreting the constitutional requirement but "purported to construe only 'The words of the act
of Congress' ...." Id. at 531 (quoting Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3Cranch) at 267). Compare the words
of Article Ill section 2, "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ...between Citizens of
different States," with the language construed by Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbridge, ..... the suit
is between a citizen of a state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state." U.S. CONST.,
art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267. Because of the almost complete lack of
analysis in the opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, Strawbridge and the "complete diversity"
requirement has come under fire over the years but manages to maintain influence and importance
mostly due to its historical pedigree. See Redish, supra note 18, at 1803-05 (referring to Chief
Justice John Marshall's opinion as "cryptic" and highlighting the lack of analysis in the opinion); see
also State Farm, 386 U.S. at 531 n.6 (discussing how "[s]ubsequent decisions of this Court indicate
that Strawbridge is not to be given an expansive reading").
21. FCSC Report, supra note 18. Limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a diversity of
citizenship cause of action by the amount in controversy is known as the "amount-in-controversy"
requirement and a claim must meet both the diversity of citizenship and the amount-in-controversy
requirement for there to be diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000); see also RICHARD D.
FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 197-
218 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000); see ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, 1 Federal Judicial
839
Over the past century the Supreme Court has applied the requirements
of diversity jurisdiction to a variety of different situations and causes of
action. Some believe this jurisprudence has led to incongruent results. 23
The following cases focus, for the most part, on the amount-in-controversy
requirement when deciding whether a federal court has original jurisdiction
24over the action.
Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 25 an early twentieth century case,
determined whether two plaintiffs could aggregate their claims to meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction.26 In this case, a
seller of land in Kentucky obtained a "vendor's lien for the unpaid portion of
the purchase price.,,2' 7  For his lien he received two promissory notes; he
then assigned one to each of the plaintiffs who brought suit.2 8  Separately,
each promissory note did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement;
however, the plaintiffs could meet the requirement if they were allowed to
aggregate the value of each of their claims. 29 The Court decided to allow
Code Revisions 2 (1999) (explaining how Congress raised the amount-in-controversy requirement to
anything over $50,000 in 1988 by enacting the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act and
then raised it again to the current in excess of $75,000 by enacting the Federal Courts Improvements
Act of 1996). The most recent increase in the amount-in-controversy requirement occurred in a
relatively short amount of time when compared to the fact that the last time the amount-in-
controversy requirement was changed prior to 1988 was in 1959 from "one in excess of $3,000 to
one in excess of $10,000." FREER & PERDUE, supra note 21, at 217-18. The ever increasing
amount-in-controversy requirement is seen as evidence that Congress is attempting to restrict access
to federal courts for claims based on diversity jurisdiction and, for some, an indication that as a
policy matter Congress does not consider the role of federal courts in diversity matters to be as
important as they once were. See Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 102
(discussing Congress' "modest limitations" but nevertheless noting an overall "trend to limit
diversity...").
23. See Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 309 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that
"it is difficult to understand why the practical approach the Court took in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
must be abandoned" when attempting to square the ruling in Zahn that all plaintiffs, even unnamed
ones, had to individually meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, but that unnamed plaintiffs
after Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur did not need to meet the geographical diversity requirement).
24. Although this section is primarily dedicated to explaining and discussing diversity
jurisdiction and the development of its judicially interpreted requirements, some cases that have
played a role in the development of "amount-in-controversy" jurisprudence are federal-question
cases. The reason for this is that general federal-question jurisdiction, which can now be found at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), used to have an "amount-in-controversy" requirement. Compare 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (2000), with Zahn, 414 U.S. at 293 & n.2 (stating that "[tihe same jurisdictional-amount
requirement has applied when the general federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts, 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a), is sought to be invoked"). See also FREER & PERDUE, supra note 21, at 222
(noting that federal-question jurisdiction "carr[ied] the [same amount-in-controversy] requirement as
that imposed by diversity of citizenship cases from 1875 until 1980, when Congress abolished it").
25. 222 U.S. 39 (1911).
26. Id. at 40; see also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337 (1969) (describing the plaintiffs in
Troy Bank as a "joinder case" much like Rule 20 now provides for in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
27. Troy Bank, 222 U.S. at 40.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 39-40 (stating that each promissory note was worth $1,200 each and that proper
diversity jurisdiction requires that "the sum or value of the matter in dispute exceed[] two thousand
840
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aggregation of the two promissory note claims to meet the jurisdictional
amount because the enforcement sought by both plaintiffs was for a
"common and undivided interest. ' '30 The case, however, is better known for
the following quote rather than the actual result: "When two or more
plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for convenience and
economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the
requisite jurisdictional amount."'" Notice that this language is used in
several other cases regarding claim aggregation, including Exxon Mobil.
32
Ten years after Troy Bank, the Court took a more expansive approach to
jurisdiction requirements in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble.33 The
appellant, the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, was challenging the dismissal of a
bill it filed in the District Court of Indiana against appellees to enjoin them
from prosecuting an action in the state courts of Indiana.3 4 Appellees were
members of the tribe and were challenging a reorganization of the entity.35
Both the appellant and the appellees were citizens of Indiana.3 6 Due to the
lack of diversity of citizenship the district court dismissed the bill for lack of
jurisdiction.37  The Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur argued that the appellees
were already bound by a judgment entered in a class action suit brought by
members of the organization in federal district court."s The named plaintiffs
in the federal class action were not citizens of Indiana, but the unnamed
plaintiffs were citizens of Indiana. 39  The main question before the Court
was whether a district court could exercise jurisdiction over the class action
dollars...").
30. Id. at 41 (stating that the enforcement of both promissory notes was really the enforcement of
the vendor's lien as a whole and that "it is enough if [the plaintiffs'] interests collectively equal the
jurisdictional amount") (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 40-41.
32. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 585 (2005).
33. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
34. Id. at 357.
35. Id. at 357-58. The dispute centered on Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur phasing out its existing
class of benefit certificates, Class A and creating a new class, Class B. Id. at 358-59. The Class A
members of the organization felt that the reorganization was just an excuse to get more money from
them and reduce their benefits. Id.
36. Id. at 357.
37. Id. at 360.
38. Id. (summarizing Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur's argument that the "prosecution of the suits in
the state courts of Indiana will have the effect to relitigate questions conclusively adjudicated against
the defendants as members of Class A in the action in the United States District Court"). The suit
was a class action based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 366. The defendant in the case, "the
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, a fraternal beneficiary society," was a citizen of Indiana. Id. at 360.
The plaintiffs in the class action were Class A members of the society. Id. at 361.
39. Id. at 360-61.
and whether a holding would be binding upon the unnamed,
nondiverse plaintiffs.4 °
The Court held that a federal court can properly exercise diversity
jurisdiction over a class action when the named parties in a class action meet
the "complete diversity" requirement even though the unnamed plaintiffs
have the same citizenship as the defendant(s). 4' The Court also held that
because the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the class action
that a holding would have the same binding effect on the unnamed and
named plaintiffs. 42 The Court explained that the citizenship of the unnamed
plaintiffs did not affect the jurisdiction of the federal court because of the
federal court's authority as a court of law and equity, the history and purpose
of the class action as a litigation device, and the fact that the named plaintiffs
met the diversity jurisdiction requirements. 43  Therefore, the Court held in
favor of the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur. 44 Although Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur does not directly pertain to the amount-in-controversy requirement, it
provides the reader with the complete picture of what was required for a
class action based on diversity jurisdiction prior to the passage of § 1367. 45
Additionally, the holding, which made it easier for a district court to exercise
jurisdiction over diversity-only class actions, stands in stark contrast to the
strict amount-in-controversy rules that developed in later cases to limit
diversity-only class actions. 46 Despite this contrast, Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur still remains good law for determining if a federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction over a class action.47
One example of a case that contributed to the development of these
strict amount-in-controversy rules is Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc. 41 Clark is a
general federal-question case, but the Court's holding is relevant to the
amount-in-controversy requirement. The case involved multiple plaintiffs,
joined in bringing suit against state officers challenging the constitutionality
of a California statute known as the Caravan Act. 49 At the time the action
40. Id. at 363.
41. Id. at 366.
42. Id. at 367.
43. Id. at 363-67 (stating that the "[dliversity of citizenship [of the named plaintiff] gave the
District Court jurisdiction," that "[tihe District Courts of the United States are courts of equity
jurisdiction, with equity powers as broad as those of state courts," and that class actions have "long
been recognized in federal jurisprudence" to "prevent a failure of justice . (quoting Smith v.
Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1854))).
44. Id. at 367.
45. See House Report No. 101-734, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6875 & n.17
(citing Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur and Zahn to describe the "jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 in diversity-only class actions").
46. See infra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
47. YEAZELL, supra note 18, at 818-19.
48. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
49. Id. at 586-87. The Caravan Act charged a $15 license fee every six months for transporting
vehicles with the purpose of selling them inside or outside of the state. Id. at 586. The plaintiffs
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was brought a claim based solely on general federal-question jurisdiction
had to meet an amount-in-controversy requirement.50 Each plaintiff was
claiming a separate injury under the statute so the Court determined that the
plaintiffs had "no joint or common interest or title in the subject matter of
the suit."'" The Court then went on to cite the "familiar rule that when
several plaintiffs assert separate and distinct demands in a single suit, the
amount involved in each separate controversy must be of the requisite
amount to be within the jurisdiction of the district court, and that those
amounts cannot be added together to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. 52
Except for Paul Gray, Inc., the Court dismissed all of the claims for want of
jurisdiction because all of the other plaintiffs were unable to establish the
amount-in-controversy for their respective claims.5 3  The reasoning in this
case became very influential in later Supreme Court decisions involving the
diversity jurisdiction amount-in-controversy requirement even though it was
a federal-question issue.
5 4
The Court had the opportunity to apply the reasoning of Clark in Snyder
v. Harris.55 Like Exxon Mobil, Snyder was a consolidation by the Court of
two lower court decisions in an effort to unify the courts.5 6 In one case, the
Eighth Circuit held that a class of stockholders could not aggregate their
claims to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity
jurisdiction." 7 In the other case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court
were "numerous individuals, copartnerships and corporations" all claiming separate but similar
injuries caused by the Caravan Act. Id. at 587. The main relief that was being asked for by the
plaintiffs was "an injunction [to] restrain[] [state officers] from collecting the fees and enforcing the
provisions of the statute in aid of their collection." Id.
50. Id. at 588 (stating that the amount-in-controversy had to exceed $3,000); see also FREER &
PERDUE, supra note 21, at 222.
51. Clark, 306 U.S. at 588 (citations omitted). Notice that although the Court did not directly
cite to Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911), the language regarding plaintiffs
with separate claims, each having to establish the jurisdictional amount separately, is very similar.
52. Clark, 306 U.S. at 589.
53. Id. at 590 (stating that "[p]roper practice requires that where each of several plaintiffs is
bound to establish the jurisdictional amount with respect to his own claim, the suit should be
dismissed as to those who fail to show that the requisite amount is involved").
54. For example, when discussing the amount-in-controversy with respect to diversity
jurisdiction, the Court in Zahn expressly states that "[t]he same jurisdictional-amount requirement
has applied when the general federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts . . . is sought to be
invoked." Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291,293 (1973).
55. 394 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1969) (citing Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), to
support the application of the no-aggregation rule to a class action based on diversity jurisdiction).
56. Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968); Gas Serv. Co. v. Cobum, 389 F.2d 831 (10th
Cir. 1968).
57. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 332-33 (noting that the case before the Court is premised upon diversity
jurisdiction as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 which at the time had an amount-in-controversy
requirement that had to "exceed[] the sum or value of $10,000 .... "
ruling that allowed a class of gas company customers to aggregate their
claims. 58 The Court in Snyder determined that:
[a]ggregation has been permitted only (1) in cases in which a single
plaintiff seeks to aggregate two or more of his own claims against a
single defendant and (2) in cases in which two or more plaintiffs
unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common
and undivided interest. 9
Further, the Court developed a no-aggregation rule which required that
"separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated
in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement., 60 Additionally, the
Court emphasized that the no-aggregation rule was formed by the Court's
interpretation of Congress' diversity jurisdiction statutes and not based upon
the cause of action's status as a class action. 61  Fearing an ever expanding
portion of federal court resources going to determine solely state law claims,
the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's holding denying aggregation and
reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision allowing aggregation.62 Finally, the
Court, most likely in response to this fear, stated that the no-aggregation rule
58. Id. at 334. The Tenth Circuit determined that the class of plaintiffs could aggregate their
claims based on the "1966 amendment to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to
class actions." Id. The Tenth Circuit found that the rules against aggregation no longer made sense
after the elimination of class classifications "'true,' 'hybrid' and 'spurious' from Rule 23 from
which the no-aggregation rule developed. Gas Serv. Co., 389 F.2d at 834. The Tenth Circuit then
determined that, under the new Rule 23 as amended, once "a cause clearly falls within its terms as a
class action ... the claims of the entire class are in controversy" and, therefore, there is no bar to
aggregation. Id. at 834-35.
59. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335. The Court then went on to state that, although the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 eliminated the different classifications of class actions, the different
treatment of different types of class actions pre-dated Rule 23 and, therefore, the no-aggregation rule
that developed had nothing to do with Rule 23 but with whether the interests of the plaintiffs where
"separate and distinct" or "common and undivided." Id. at 335-37.
60. Id. at 335.
61. Id. at 335-36. The Court further strengthened its position that its interpretation and
aggregation rules regarding the amount-in-controversy requirement pre-dated the 1938 Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and were only based on the congressionally-granted diversity or federal
jurisdiction statutes by citing Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911). Snyder,
394 U.S. at 336. The Court also went on to discuss that one reason that it felt that it could not allow
aggregation in class actions was that "[a]ny change in the doctrine of aggregation in class action
cases under Rule 23 would inescapably have to be applied as well to the liberal joinder provisions of
Rule 20 and to the joinder of claims provisions of Rule 18." Id. at 340. The Court feared that this
"inescapabl[e] ... result would... allow aggregation of practically any claims of any parties that for
any reason happen to be brought together in a single action [and] would seriously undercut the
purpose of the jurisdictional amount requirement." Id. Additionally, the Court determined that it
had to keep a more demanding amount-in-controversy interpretation because the diversity of
citizenship requirement for a class action had been greatly liberalized by the holding in Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 366, and, therefore, if aggregation was allowed the federal courts
would be have to hear "numerous local controversies involving exclusively questions of state law."
Snyder, 394 U.S. at 340.
62. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335-36.
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applied to Rule 23 and Rule 20 plaintiffs.63 The result was that both class
actions were unable to continue because none of the plaintiffs met the
amount-in-controversy requirement. 64
The Court in Zahn v. International Paper Co. 65 had to answer a slightly
different question than in Snyder.66 In Zahn, each of the named plaintiffs in
the class action met both requirements of diversity jurisdiction. 67  The
question before the Court was whether the unnamed plaintiffs had to be
dismissed for not meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement. 68  The
Court held that "[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy
the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed
from the case-'one plaintiff may not ride in on another's coattails."'
' 69
Ultimately, the Court found the argument that class actions required a more
liberal interpretation of the amount-in-controversy requirement
unpersuasive.70 In support of its holding, the Court stated that it was
consistent with its jurisprudence regarding "ordinary joinder of plaintiffs
with separate and distinct claims" and that the rule must stand "absent
further congressional action.'
63. Id. at 337. The Court stated that there is "no reason to treat [Rule 23 or Rule 20 plaintiffs]
differently... for purposes of aggregation." Id. The Court also recognized that the no-aggregation
rule upheld in Snyder would apply equally to the amount-in-controversy requirement of general
federal-question jurisdiction but dismissed the impact of its holding on such cases by pointing out
that most federal-question matters where exempted from the amount-in-controversy requirement. Id.
at 341. But see id. at 342 n.2, 354 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's
characterization of the impact of the no-aggregation rule on federal-question matters, stating that
some general constitutional cases would not be heard by a federal court).
64. Id. at 333-36.
65. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
66. Compare Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. at 291 (stating that the named plaintiffs met the
diversity jurisdiction requirements under the diversity jurisdiction statute but that the unnamed
plaintiffs did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement), with Snyder, 394 U.S. at 333-34
(stating that none of the named plaintiffs in either class action could meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement without aggregation). Since Zahn presents a slightly different issue than that in Snyder,
the Court felt that one of main issues before it was whether or not the "Court of Appeals . . .
accurately read and applied Snyder v. Harris." Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
67. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 291-92
68. Id. The amount-in-controversy at the time the suit was brought was "in excess of $10,000."
Id. at 292.
69. Id. at 301 (citing Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir. 1972)). The Court
went on to state that its holding in Zahn would extend to "a class action invoking general federal-
question jurisdiction" as well. Id. at 302 n. 11.
70. Id. at 302.
71. Id. Justice Brennan in a dissenting opinion criticized the Court's lack of initiative and
reliance on the absence of congressional action, stating that the Court ignored the possibility of
allowing the claims under the theory of ancillary jurisdiction, that "[tihe Court's prior decisions
upholding novel exercises of ancillary jurisdiction have made liberal use of the opportunities
presented by the Civil Rules ... ," and that the class action plaintiffs' main argument was not that
845
After Zahn was decided, each plaintiff joined under Rule 2072 or in a
class action under Rule 23(b)(3) 7 3 (named or unnamed), whether under
diversity jurisdiction or general federal-question jurisdiction, had to meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement or have his or her individual claim
dismissed.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF ANCILLARY AND PENDENT JURISDICTION
Prior to the passage of section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction was
separated into two separate categories: pendent and ancillary.74
Pendent jurisdiction refers to claims that are joined in the plaintiff's
complaint. Pendent claim jurisdiction allows a plaintiff to join to a
federal claim a factually related state claim despite the absence of
diversity. Pendent party jurisdiction permits a plaintiff to join to a
federal claim a factually related state claim involving an additional,
nondiverse party. Ancillary jurisdiction refers to additional claims
that are joined after the complaint is filed. 75
aggregation should be allowed to support jurisdiction, but that "ancillary jurisdiction supports a
determination that those claims be entertained." Id. at 305, 306 & n.7, 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part:
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any
right to relief jointly, severally, or in the altemative in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question
of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action .... A plaintiff or
defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief
demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their
respective liabilities.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (emphasis added).
73. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: ... (3) the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members .... The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(3) (emphasis added).
74. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, 1 WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS
546 (1990) [hereinafter SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT].
75. Id.
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The history of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction has been traced back by
some scholars to Osborn v. Bank of the United States,76 an 1824 decision.77
In recent history some of the biggest supplemental jurisdiction cases are:
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,78 United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs,79 Aldinger v. Howard,80 and Finley v. United States.8
These cases will be discussed in Part III to: (1) trace the development
of supplemental jurisdiction; and (2) illustrate the differences between
pendent-claim, pendent-party, and ancillary jurisdiction prior to the passage
of§ 1367.
A. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger82 is significant as an attempt
to get the Court to recognize a new application of ancillary jurisdiction.83
The plaintiff was a citizen of Iowa, the original defendant was a citizen of
Nebraska; however, the defendant "then filed a third-party complaint
pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 14(a) ... against ... Owen Equipment and
Erection Co."' 84  Subsequently, the plaintiff amended her complaint to
include Owen Equipment, a citizen of Iowa, and in an unreported opinion
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the original
defendant leaving only the case between plaintiff and Owen Equipment to
76. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
77. Arthur D. Wolf, Codification of Supplemental Jurisdiction: Anatomy of a Legislative
Proposal, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992); see also Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion
and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY
L.J. 445, 449 n.26 (1991) (stating that the quote by Chief Justice John Marshall that "'[t]here is
scarcely any case, every part of which depends on the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States' . .. opened the door for exercising supplemental jurisdiction") (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 820).
78. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
79. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
80. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
81. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
82. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
83. See id. at 367. The Court stated that in previous cases it had already determined that
ancillary jurisdiction could be used to sustain jurisdiction over cases that "typically involve[d]
claims by a defending party haled into court against his will, or by another person whose rights
might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court" when
such cases "involv[ed] impleader, cross-claims, and counterclaims." Id. at 375-76, 380-81.
84. Id. at 367-68 (footnote omitted). The plaintiff alleged that Owen Equipment was a citizen of
Nebraska in her amended complaint. Id. at 368-69. Owen Equipment admitted that it was a
Nebraska corporation in its answer but it was then disclosed on the third day of trial that its principal
place of business was in Iowa. Id. at 369.
go to trial. 85 The Court summarized the question before it as: "In an action
in which federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, may the
plaintiff assert a claim against a third-party defendant when there is no
independent basis for federal jurisdiction over that claim?"86  The Court
reasoned that to determine whether or not ancillary jurisdiction could be
properly exercised by a federal court, two "hurdle[s] ... must be overcome:"
the first is determining if a federal court has the "Constitutional power" to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction; and the second being an "Act[] of Congress"
that "confer[ed] jurisdiction over the federal claim" that "allow[ed for] the
exercise of jurisdiction over the nonfederal claims. 87 The Court presumed
that the district court had the constitutional power to hear the case and
decided to focus on whether or not the diversity jurisdiction statute passed
by Congress allowed for the exercise of that constitutional power. 88
The Court turned to its diversity jurisdiction jurisprudence to determine
if ancillary jurisdiction could be properly exercised in this case. 89 The Court
reaffirmed the complete diversity rule and it made clear that "diversity
jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different
State from each plaintiff."90 The Court noted that had the plaintiff brought
suit against Owen Equipment & Erection Co. initially that the district court
could not have exercised federal jurisdiction over her case because of the
complete diversity requirement. 91 Therefore, the Court felt that the plaintiff
should not be allowed to "defeat . . . complete diversity by the simple
expedient of suing only those defendants who were of diverse citizenship
and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants., 92 In denying the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, the Court made it clear that it was
upholding the traditional interpretation of the diversity jurisdiction statute
and that there was no additional act of Congress which allowed the federal
courts to exercise their constitutional power to hear the case. 93
85. Id. at 368-69.
86. Id. at 367.
87. Id. at 372 (footnote omitted). The Court throughout the opinion used "the term 'nonfederal
claim' [to] mean[] one as to which there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction [and
c]onversely, a 'federal claim' [to] mean[] one as to which an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction exists." Id. at 372 n.1 1.
88. Id. at 372-73.
89. Id. at 370, 373. The Court also made clear that although it would make use of the term
"ancillary jurisdiction," it was not "necessary to determine here 'whether there are any "principled"
differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction . .. "' and that pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction are "species of the same generic problem." Id. at 370 & n.8 (quoting Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976)).
90. Id. at 373.
91. /d.at374.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 377.
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United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs94 has been noted for its
expansive approach to supplemental jurisdiction.95 In Gibbs, the plaintiff
brought both a federal claim under § 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act 96 and a state claim that involved many of the same facts
necessary to prove the federal claim but without an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction. 97 The Court determined that the district court properly
exercised its pendent jurisdiction power because the "same nucleus of
operative fact" gave rise to the two claims. 98 In its holding, the Court
simplified years of pendent jurisdiction jurisprudence by creating the
following definition:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever
there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority. . .," and the relationship between that claim and the
state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the
court comprises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim
must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction
on the court. The state and federal claims must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without
regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiffs claims are such
that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there
is power in federal courts to hear the whole. 99
94. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
95. Wolf, supra note 77, at 7-8.- See also SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at 548 (noting
that prior to the Court's decision in Gibbs, "federal courts exercised only a limited pendent
jurisdiction").
96. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 61 Stat. 136, 158 (1947).
97. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 717-18, 720, 722. The jury at the trial level returned a verdict for both the
federal and the state claim. Id. at 720. However, the judge at the district court level set aside the
jury verdict based on the federal claim upon the defendant's "motion for a directed verdict and a
judgment n.o.v." Id. at 728. The Court determined that because the jury returned a verdict for both
the federal and the state claim, it was not improper for the district court to consider the state claim as
pendent to the federal claim, but had the federal claim not reached the jury, the appropriateness of
considering the state claim pendent would have been questionable. Id. at 728-29.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 725 (citations & footnotes omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
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The Court determined that its definition: (1) was an accurate summation
of past cases; (2) was fully within the scope of its constitutional power; (3)
was accommodating of the policy of more liberal joinder of claims
embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (4) that a more
"limited approach [would be] unnecessarily grudging" with respect to
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." 00
2. Pendent-Party
In Aldinger v. Howard,'0 1 the Court began to limit what appeared to be
the expansive grant of pendent jurisdiction in Gibbs.10 2  The plaintiff in
Aldinger brought a claim against officials of Spokane County, Washington
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with federal
jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).103 The plaintiff also tried to bring
related state law claims, for which there was no independent basis for federal
jurisdiction, against Spokane County. 104 The question before the Court was
whether a federal court could appropriately exercise pendent jurisdiction
over the related state claims that were not supported by an affirmative grant
of federal jurisdiction.'05
One of the ways in which the Court differentiated Gibbs from Aldinger
was that in Gibbs the plaintiff was attempting to assert an additional claim
against a defendant over whom the federal court already had jurisdiction,
whereas in Aldinger, the plaintiff was attempting to add an additional party
over which a federal court had no independent jurisdiction. 10 6  The Court
compared the relative fairness of allowing pendent-claim jurisdiction to
100. Id. at 725, 726 & n.13. The Court eschewed a definition of pendent jurisdiction power
derived from Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), that required a court to determine whether a
non-federal claim vindicated the same right as the federal claim or was a separate "cause of action. "
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 722-25. One of the main problems that the Court found with the Hun test was its
propensity to create confusion in its application by the lower courts, especially with respect to
defining the term "cause of action." Id. at 724-25. The Court also went on to discuss possible
factors that should be considered by a district court as to whether it should exercise its pendent
jurisdiction power: (1) if "federal claims are dismissed before trial," (2) "if it appears that the state
issues substantially predominate," or (3) if "the likelihood of jury confusion in treating divergent
legal theories of relief.. .would justify separating state and federal claims for trial." Id. at 726-27.
101. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
102. Wolf, supra note 77, at 12 (describing A Idinger as one of the cases "restricting supplemental
jurisdiction" after Gibbs).
103. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 3-4.
104. Id.
105. Id. The Court was not only concerned in this case that there was no independent grant of
federal jurisdiction over the state law claims, but also that Congress, when passing 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000), expressly decided to "exclude[]" municipalities like Spokane County "from liability in §
1983," and that if the Court granted the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, it would be defeating the
intent of Congress. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17.
106. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 14.
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allowing pendent-party jurisdiction. 10 7  The opinion of the Court was that
allowing a pendent-claim that originated from the "'common nucleus' of
facts as the federal claim (a claim over which a federal court has
jurisdiction) "would not be an 'unfair' use of federal power by the suing
party, he already having placed the defendant properly in federal court for a
substantial federal cause of action." 10 8  The Court determined that the
decision in Gibbs was appropriate because "Congress was silent on the
extent to which the defendant, already properly in federal court under a
statute, might be called upon to answer nonfederal questions or claims. 10 9
It is axiomatic that defendants in a pendent-claim situation are the type
of people over whom Congress wanted federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction. 0  However, the Court stated that "'pendent-party'
jurisdiction-bringing in an additional defendant at the behest of the
plaintiff-present[ed] rather different statutory jurisdictional
considerations.""1'1 Therefore, the Court felt that the true question before it
was whether Congress had spoken as to whether it would allow or not allow
a federal court to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction over a municipality in a
"deprivation[] of civil rights" case.112
After finding that Congress had already decided not to include
municipalities as parties over whom federal jurisdiction could be asserted
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)"' and 42 U.S.C. § 1983114 the Court concluded
107. Id. at 14-15.
108. Id. at 14 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725) (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
110. After all, they are always in federal court under some "particular [congressional] grant of
subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. at 14.
111. See id. at 14-15 (emphasis added). The Court seemed concerned that if it allowed a plaintiff
to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction too freely over additional defendants, such defendants would
be unfairly haled into federal court on solely state-law claims over which there was no independent
federal jurisdiction (i.e. diversity jurisdiction), and, therefore, the federal courts would no longer be
acting as "courts of limited jurisdiction." Id. at 14-15. Further, the Court was of the opinion that
pendent-party jurisdiction, as argued for by the plaintiff, was not based on the same issues of fairness
underlying the similar doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. See id. at 11-14 (noting that although there
was "little profit in attempting to decide . . . whether there are any 'principled' differences between
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction," the Court determined that when it had allowed additional
defendants under the "doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction [it was] bottomed on the notion that since
federal jurisdiction in the principal suit effectively controls the property or fund under dispute, the
other claimants thereto should be allowed to intervene in order to protect their interests, without
regard to jurisdiction;" the Court found the need to exercise jurisdiction over a new defendant
"simply because [the state claim is] 'derive[d] from a common nucleus of operative fact' less
compelling (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725)).
112. Id. at 16.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (2000).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
that it would be contrary to congressional intent to allow the plaintiff
to circumvent the federal statutes by allowing a federal court to use
pendent-party jurisdiction over the municipality." 5  Ultimately, the Court
"concluded that [pendent-party] jurisdiction exists, [if] a federal court . . .
satisfjies] itself not only that Art[icle] III permits it, but that Congress





In Finley v. United States,117 the Court further restricted the exercise of
pendent-party jurisdiction by federal courts. The reasoning utilized by the
Court was recognized by many as putting the doctrine of supplemental
jurisdiction in jeopardy. 118 The plaintiff in Finley filed a federal claim
against the United States in federal district court with jurisdiction based on
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). "9 In addition to the federal claim,
over which the district court had exclusive jurisdiction, the plaintiff "moved
to amend . . . to include claims against . . . state-court defendants, as to
which no independent basis for federal jurisdiction existed."'' 20  The Court
115. See Aldinger, 427 at 16-17. Although the Court did not allow the exercise of pendent-party
jurisdiction in this instance, it did indicate that it might allow pendent-party jurisdiction "when the
grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for example, as in the prosecution of tort claims
against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, the argument of judicial economy and
convenience can be coupled with the additional argument that only in federal court may all of the
claims be tried together." Id. at 18.
116. Id. at 18.
117. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
118. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at 554 (noting that "none of the existing
jurisdictional statutes expressly confers [pendent-party jurisdiction] authority" as required under the
holding in Finley); House Report No. 101-734, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6874
(reporting that "the Supreme Court cast substantial doubt on the authority of the federal courts to
hear some claims within supplemental jurisdiction" and that "some lower courts have interpreted
Finley to prohibit the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in formerly unquestioned
circumstances"); see also Freer, supra note 77, at 467 (stating the possibility that "Finley . . .
presages the end of all forms of supplemental jurisdiction"). See generally Karen Nelson Moore,
The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An Important But Controversial Supplement to Federal
Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31, 32 (1992) (stating that by its ruling in Finley "the Supreme Court
markedly cut back upon, and probably eliminated, pendent party jurisdiction, and [raised]
significant doubts about the proper jurisdictional rationale for all of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction").
119. Finley, 490 U.S. at 546; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) ("the district courts.., shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages.., for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment"). Notice that this case involved the joining of an additional party to a Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) claim, the exact hypothetical that the Court in Aldinger stated was more likely
to prevail. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
120. Finley, 490 U.S. at 546. The plaintiffs claim arose from an airplane accident at a San Diego
airfield. Id. She initially filed a claim against the San Diego Gas and Electric Company in state
court but "later discovered that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was in fact the party
responsible" for the airfield and filed suit against them in the district court. Id. The state claim that
the plaintiff wanted to amend was the original claim against San Diego Gas and Electric Company.
Id.
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emphasized that not only must there be constitutional power to exercise
pendent jurisdiction but that there must also be congressional authorization
for the exercise of such power."'2 The main question in Finley was whether
Congress had authorized the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction through
the FTCA. 2 2  The Court determined that the answer to this question was
no. 12  The Court stressed that its holding was entirely consistent with its
121. Id. at 548 ("[T]wo things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate.
The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must
have supplied it.... To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant.") (quoting
Chief Justice Swayne in The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1869)); see also Moore,
supra note 118, at 37 (describing the "urgency of providing a principled statutory basis for
supplemental jurisdiction" after the Court's decision in Finley).
122. Finley, 490 U.S. at 549. The Court "assume[d], without deciding, that the constitutional
criterion for pendent-party jurisdiction is analogous to the constitutional criterion for pendent-claim
jurisdiction and that petitioner's state-law claims pass[ed] that test." Id. The Court also recognized
that it had allowed the exercise of the pendent-claim jurisdiction to the full constitutional extent
"without specific examination of jurisdictional statutes" but that for pendent-party jurisdiction the
Court would "not assume that the full constitutional power [had] been congressionally authorized,
and [would] not read jurisdictional statutes broadly." Id. at 548-49. The Court cited Zahn as an
example of a case in which the jurisdictional statute granting diversity jurisdiction was not read
broadly. Id. The Court stated that in Zahn, the diversity jurisdiction statute (the congressional grant
of jurisdiction) was what limited the exercise of jurisdiction because, otherwise, the claims of the
plaintiffs who did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement in Zahn "would together [with
the claims that did have an independent basis for federal jurisdiction] have amounted to a single
'case' under Gibbs," thereby establishing the constitutional power to hear the claim. See id. at 549-
50.
123. Id. at 556. The Court came to this holding by balancing certain factors and considerations.
The first of these factors was the similar facts shared by the FTCA and the state-law claims;
however, the Court did not find this factor substantial enough to justify the extension of pendent-
party jurisdiction. Id. at 552. The Court supported this position by pointing to the language in Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 367-77 (1978), which stated that "neither the
convenience of the litigants nor considerations ofjudicial economy can suffice to justify extension of
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction." Finley, 490 U.S. at 552. The Court also addressed the issue
of judicial economy. Id. By being denied pendent-party jurisdiction the plaintiff had to bring two
different court proceedings, one in federal court and another in state court, because the jurisdiction
granting statute gave the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims against the United
States. Id. The Court determined that "[this] alone [was] not enough" and that "efficiency and
convenience" cannot justify pendent-party jurisdiction without the necessary congressional
authority. Id. at 552, 555-56. Additionally, the Court interpreted the language of the FTCA, which
"confer[ed] jurisdiction over 'civil actions on claims against the United States,"' as not establishing
a "minimum jurisdictional requirement [but] rather a definition of the permissible scope of FTCA
actions." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2002)). The Court defined the "permissible scope" as
claims "against the United States and no one else" much like "'between ... citizens of different
States' has been held to mean citizens of different States and no one else." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) (2000)). Lastly, the Court addressed the plaintiff's argument that the words "civil actions"
in 28 U.S.C. § 1346 was meant to include civil actions which "include[] a claim against the United
States." Id. at 554. This argument was based on the fact that the language of the statute used to read
"on any claim" but was changed to "civil actions." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 931 (1946) & 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1952)). The Court quickly dismissed this argument, emphasizing that the language was
changed to be in conformance with the use of "civil action" in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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jurisprudence of requiring "that jurisdiction be explicitly conferred" by
Congress and that "[t]he Gibbs line of cases [was] a departure from prior
practice, and a departure that [the Court had] no intent[ion] to limit or
impair."' 124 At the end of the Finley opinion Justice Scalia writing for the
Court sent the following invitation to Congress: 1
25
Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a
particular statute can of course be changed by Congress. What is of
paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a
background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the
effect of the language it adopts. All our cases-Zahn, Aldinger, and
Kroger-have held that a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving
particular parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over additional
claims by or against different parties. 126
Congress was not long in sending its R.S.V.P. by enacting § 1367.
IV. THE CREATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1367: A "NONCONTROVERSIAL"
STATUTE
After Finley was decided on May 22, 1989, Congress enacted, on
December 1, 1990, the Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, and included in
that legislation was the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation
Act of 1990 (FCSC Act). 12 7 Included in the FCSC Act was an amendment
to "Chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code" which codified the doctrine
of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.128 The words of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, in relevant part, are as
follows:
(a)Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided ...by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
and that it ran counter to "established canons of statutory construction" to infer a change in the law
when Congress revises laws "unless such an intention is clearly expressed." Id. (quoting Anderson
v. Pac. Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 199 (1912)).
124. Id. at 556.
125. See Wolf, supra note 77, at 15.
126. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 545; H.R. 5316, 101st Cong., 104 Stat. 5089, 5104 (1990). The FCSC Act
implemented the "noncontroversial recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee."
H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, at 16, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6862. The Federal Courts Study
Committee (FCSC) was created by the Federal Courts Study Act which was a part of the Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act. H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988).
The FCSC was a "15 member Committee to study the Federal courts for 15 months and recommend
reforms." H.R. Rep. No. 16; see also FCSC Report, supra note 18.
128. H.R. 5316, 101st Cong., 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14 (1990).
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have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.
(b)In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a)
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule
14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over
claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19
of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of
such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such
claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of
section 1332.129
Soon after the passage of the "noncontroversial" supplemental
jurisdiction statute, debate and controversy arose over how much it
broadened the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in federal courts. 130 This
debate was not limited to legal scholars and it inevitably found its way into
the courts. 131 Prior to the Supreme Court deciding the effect of 28 U.S.C. §
1367 on Zahn, every circuit court except for the Second Circuit had weighed
in on the issue to some degree. 1
32
It was in this context of intense disagreement that the Supreme Court of
the United States decided to resolve the dispute in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services Inc. 1
33
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)-(b) (2000).
130. H.R. Rep. No. 16. See Freer, supra note 77, at 471 ("The statute has several presumably
unforeseen consequences as well, such as precluding supplemental jurisdiction in alienage cases and
confusing areas that had been relatively clear even in the aftermath of Finley."); see also Rowe, Jr.,
Burbank & Mengler, supra note 16, at 961 (responding to Professor Freer's assertion that § 1367 is
confusing and that although "[t]he statute is concededly not perfect" that "Section 1367 reflects an
effort to provide sufficient detail without overdoing it").
131. Compare Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 222 (1999) (holding that
28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not overturn Zahn in an opinion written by Circuit Judge Weis, who was also
Chair of the Federal Court Study Committee), with In re Abbot Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 527-29 (1995)
(discussing the disagreement between the district courts and legal scholars but determining that even
if the overturning of Zahn was a "clerical error" that the language of the statute itself unambiguously
required such a result).
132. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 550-51 (2005).
133. Id.
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V. EXXON MOBIL CORP. V. ALLAPA TTAH SERVICES, INC.
A. Facts & Procedural History
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 3 4 the Supreme Court
consolidated an Eleventh Circuit case, Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon
Mobil Corp.,135 with a First Circuit case, Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. 136
Allapattah Services was a "class action suit filed by approximately
10,000 Exxon dealers who alleged that Exxon Corp. breached its dealer
agreements by overcharging them for fuel purchases."' 137  The dealers
received a favorable special verdict from the jury in district court.'3 8 The
class claimed that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction based on
diversity jurisdiction. 139 However, some of the unnamed plaintiffs did not
meet the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), thereby
raising the specter of Zahn v. International Paper Co. 140 The district court
certified the question of whether § 1367 overturned Zahn for interlocutory
appeal because it was unsure if it could exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the unnamed plaintiffs under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, despite the holding in
Zahn. 14  The Eleventh Circuit, upon reviewing the question, held that
134. Id.
135. 333 F.3d 1248 (11 th Cir. 2003).
136. 370 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2004).
137. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1251. The dispute was whether Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon),
through its "Discount for Cash program," promised its dealers that it would reduce the price of
wholesale gasoline and diesel fuel by the roughly the same percentage that it was charging for
processing credit card receipts, thereby encouraging the use of cash. Allapattah Servs., Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1311-12 (S.D. Fla. 1999). The plaintiffs alleged that Exxon
breached the promise, that it did not lower the price of the wholesale gasoline and diesel fuel and
that in essence they were charged the credit card fee twice. Id. at 1313. The plaintiffs claimed that
Exxon engaged in this overcharging "between March 1, 1983 and August 31, 1994." Allapattah,
333 F.3d at 1252.
138. Allapattah Servs. v. Exxon Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2001). The dealers
were made a class under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3) and the plaintiffs
asserted that the federal court had jurisdiction over their claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Id. at
1306-07; Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1253, 1255-56. The suit was originally filed by the dealers in May
of 1991 but the case "was tried to a hung jury in September of 1999 .... It was retried in January of
2001, resulting in a unanimous jury verdict in favor of the dealers." Id. at 1252.
139. Allapattah Servs., 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1294, 1306 n.14.
140. Id. at 1294, 1306 n.14, 1307. Recall that the Supreme Court in Zahn found that if an
unnamed plaintiff did not independently meet the amount in controversy requirement that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 prevented a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over that claim. Zahn v. Int'l Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291, 302 (1973).
141. Allapattah Servs., 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1326-27 (certifying its order for interlocutory appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)); Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1253 ("The first question certified for
interlocutory review by the district court was whether it had supplemental jurisdiction over the
claims of all the class members, including those who failed to meet the minimum amount in
controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).").
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"§ 1367 clearly and unambiguously overrules Zahn and allows a district
court entertaining a diversity class action to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over class members whose claims do not meet the jurisdictional
amount[-] in[-] controversy requirement." 14
2
The facts of Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. 14' are more dramatic than
those in Allapattah.'44 The main plaintiff in Ortega was a then nine-year-
old girl by the name of Beatriz Blanco-Ortega (Beatriz). 145 Beatriz cut her
pinky finger on a can of tuna made by Star-Kist, the cut itself "was about a
quarter of an inch deep, and about three-quarters of an inch long."'' 46 Other
possible damages as a result of the injury were "additional reconstructive
surgery," ".a greater possibility of the development of degenerative joint
disease at the affected finger joint," "a 3% partial impairment of her right
dominant upper extremity," "a 2% impairment of her whole person," and
emotional damages. 147 Beatriz's parents and older sister joined as Rule 20
plaintiffs with their own claims of emotional damages against Star-Kist.
48
The district court dismissed all of the claims for failing to meet the amount-
in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 149  Upon appeal, the
First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Beatriz's family members joined
under Rule 20, but found that it could not be determined to a legal certainty
that Beatriz's claim did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.1
50
Therefore, the First Circuit held that Beatriz could either continue to pursue
her claim in federal district court or "re-file in the Puerto Rico courts" with
her family's claims.' 5' In support of its holding, the First Circuit determined
that supplemental jurisdiction could not be exercised by the district court
over the independently insufficient claims. 5 2 The First Circuit came to this
conclusion by "hold[ing] that by limiting supplemental jurisdiction to 'civil
actions of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,' . . . Congress
preserved the traditional rule that each plaintiff in a diversity action must
separately satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement."' 5 3
142. Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1254.
143. 370 F.3d 124 (lst Cir. 2004).
144. Although arguably a matter of opinion, the author is confident that most readers will agree.
145. Ortega, 370 F.3d at 126.
146. Ortega v. Star Kist Foods, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 84, 85 (D.P.R. 2002).
147. Id. at 86.
148. Ortega, 370 F.3d at 139; see FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
149. Ortega, 370 F.3d at 126-27.
150. Id. at 129, 131.
151. Id. at 144.
152. Id. at 127.
153. Id. The First Circuit determined that in this instance the requirement of Clark that every
separate claim had to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement was not displaced by the passage
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B. Analysis of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.
The Supreme Court had previously attempted to give a definitive answer
on the effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 on Zahn; however, the result was a 4-4
split in Free v. Abbot Laboratories, Inc., in which the judgment of the lower
court was affirmed in an opinion per curiam.' 54 Unknowingly, the Supreme
Court, heeding the words of Sim6n Bolivar, that "to do something right it
must be done twice,"' 155 finally settled the dispute in Exxon Mobil. 1
56
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority of
the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil. 157 He was joined by then Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Souter and Thomas.15 8 The Court held that
28 U.S.C. § 1367 overruled both Zahn and Clark.'59 Justice Ginsburg wrote
a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Breyer
joined. 160 Her dissent disagrees with the Court's characterization of the
statutory text as unambiguous, and she argues for the adoption of a
'sympathetic textualism' approach that would retain the jurisprudence of
Zahn and Clark as part of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.161 Justice Stevens also wrote a
separate dissent, in which Justice Breyer joined, that criticized the Court's
characterization of the statute as unambiguous and strenuously criticized the
Court for ignoring language in the legislative history that he felt was a
"virtual billboard of congressional intent."' 162  The following sections will
analyze and critique each of these opinions.
1. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
At the beginning of his opinion, Justice Kennedy gives a brief factual
and procedural synopsis of each case and reemphasizes the importance of
resolving the question before the Court by describing the widespread
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Id. at 136-38. The First Circuit then determined that since all of the plaintiffs'
claims constituted the "civil action," and Clark required that every claim in that "civil action"
independently meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, and Beatriz's family members did not
independently meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, the "civil action" embodied by all the
claims was not one "of which the district courts have original jurisdiction" and, therefore, the
requirement of § 1367(a) was not met and supplemental jurisdiction could not be exercised over the
family member claims joined under Rule 20. Id. at 137. The First Circuit declined, however, to
determine whether its sympathetic textualism would also overturn Zahn. Id. at 136.
154. 529 U.S. 333 (2000); see Ortega, 370 F.3d at 132 ("The Supreme Court once granted
certiorari to resolve the matter, but it ultimately split 4-4 and affirmed without opinion").
155. Wikiquote, Sim6n Bolivar, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/SimC3%B3nBolC3%ADvar
(last visited Feb. 12, 2005) (English translations of Sim6n Bolivar quotes).
156. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
157. Id. at 548.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 571.
160. Id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 572, 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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disagreement among the circuit courts as to the effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367
on Zahn and Clark. 163 Justice Kennedy's opinion can be separated into the
following five categories: (1) a historical analysis of diversity and
supplemental jurisdiction; (2) the Court's interpretation of § 1367; (3) an
explanation as to why the definition of a "civil action" in the two dissenting
opinions is anathema to the concept of supplemental jurisdiction and,
therefore, cannot be used to interpret a supplemental jurisdiction statute; (4)
an explanation of why the Court did not look to the legislative history and
arguing that, even if they did, the legislative history leads to an inconclusive
result; and (5) an explanation as to why the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA) does not affect the Court's interpretation of § 1367.1 64
a. A History of Federal Court Jurisdiction Jurisprudence According to
Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy reconfirms the Court's commitment to the maxim that
"[t]he district courts of the United States . . . are 'courts of limited
jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and
statute."' 165 Justice Kennedy admits that certain cases, like Gibbs, seem to
conflict with this principal.1 66 However, he explains that Finley rationalized
the Gibbs decision as standing for the principle that pendent-claim
jurisdiction could be exercised because such power was impliedly granted to
the federal courts by the jurisdictional statute that brought the parties
properly within the federal court's jurisdiction in the first place. 167 Although
the Gibbs approach is expansive as to pendent-claims, Justice Kennedy notes
that the Court has been reluctant to apply this expansive approach when
additional parties are necessary to pursue supplemental claims. 
16 8
As an example of a statutory limitation on the expansive approach in
Gibbs, Justice Kennedy cites the "complete diversity requirement" that has
been read into § 1332.169 When Justice Kennedy describes the "complete
diversity requirement," he focuses on the need for complete diversity of
163. Id.at550-51.
164. Id. at 550-51,556-60, 567-68, 570-73.
165. Id. at 552 (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
Justice Kennedy cites both the general federal-question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the federal
diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as examples of how federal courts must look to
congressional grants to exercise jurisdiction even if the power to do so already lies in the
Constitution. Id.
166. Id. at 552-53.
167. Id. at 553.
168. Id.
169. Id.
citizenship. 7 0 It is because of the complete diversity of citizenship required
by § 1332, Justice Kennedy explains, that Gibbs cannot be applied to allow
nondiverse parties. 1 ' Such parties destroy the "original jurisdiction with
respect to all claims, so there is nothing to which supplemental jurisdiction
can adhere." 
7 2
Justice Kennedy then compares the complete diversity of citizenship
requirement with the statutory requirements of federal-question and amount-
in-controversy. 173 He asserts that unlike the diversity requirement, in which
one claim not meeting the requirement destroys diversity jurisdiction for all
claims in the action, that "federal-question and amount-in-controversy
requirements . . . can be analyzed claim by claim."' 174  Because the
requirements are analyzed claim by claim, Justice Kennedy posits that the
failure of one claim to meet the requirement does not affect the jurisdictional
standing of other claims in the action. 175
The opinion notes that the Court has not applied Gibbs to "so-called
pendent-party cases" even though the application of Gibbs to an insufficient
claim does not destroy another claim's fulfillment of the federal-question or
amount-in-controversy requirements. 176 Justice Kennedy explains that Clark
established the need for each Rule 20 plaintiff to independently meet the
jurisdictional requirements. 177  Further, he finds the holding in Clark
significant because the Court relied on it heavily when it determined that
each plaintiff must meet the amount-in-controversy requirement "in the
context of a class action brought invoking § 1332(a) diversity
jurisdiction."'' 78  Justice Kennedy characterizes cases like Aldinger and
Kroger as cases that denied "supplemental jurisdiction over claims against
170. Id. at 553-54 ("In a case with multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, the presence in the
action of a single plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant deprives the district court of
original jurisdiction over the entire action. The complete diversity requirement is not mandated by
the Constitution, or by the plain text of § 1332(a). The Court, nonetheless, has adhered to the
complete diversity rule in light of the purpose of the diversity requirement, which is to provide a
federal forum for important disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring,
home-state litigants. The presence of parties from the same State on both sides of a case dispels this
concern, eliminating a principal reason for conferring § 1332 jurisdiction over any of the claims in
the action.") (citations omitted). In fact, Justice Kennedy refers to the amount-in-controversy as a
separate "statutory prerequisite[] for federal jurisdiction." Id. at 554.
171. Id. at 553-54.




176. Id. Justice Kennedy defines "so-called pendent-party cases" as "[cases] involving
supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving additional parties-plaintiffs or defendants-where
the district courts would lack original jurisdiction over claims by each of the parties standing alone."
Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 555 (noting that although Clark was a federal-question case, the Court in Zahn relied
heavily on Clark's reasoning regarding the amount-in-controversy requirement).
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additional defendants that fall outside the district courts' original
jurisdiction" because the underlying statute granting original jurisdiction
over the main claim did not allow it. 
179
It is the belief of Justice Kennedy that the Court's decision in Finley is
the culmination of the Court's reasoning in cases like "Zahn, Aldinger, and
Kroger," and that the holding in Finley did not prevent the application of
Gibbs to pendent-claims.' 80 He is also of the belief that the decision
prevented courts from presuming that a statute granting federal jurisdiction
authorized a federal court to exercise its full constitutional power over
pendent-parties (plaintiff or defendant). 8 '
Justice Kennedy ends his explanation of the history of supplemental
jurisdiction prior to the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as follows:
First, the diversity requirement in § 1332(a) required complete
diversity; absent complete diversity, the district court lacked
original jurisdiction over all of the claims in the action. Second, if
the district court had original jurisdiction over at least one claim, the
jurisdictional statutes implicitly authorized supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims between the same parties arising
out of the same Article III case or controversy. Third, even when
the district court had original jurisdiction over one or more claims
between particular parties, the jurisdictional statutes did not
authorize supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims involving
other parties. 1
8 2
b. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and Its Meaning
Justice Kennedy briefly discusses how "Congress accepted the [Court's]
invitation" in Finley and passed 28 U.S.C. § 1367.18' He also states that,
regardless of the current disagreement on the effect of § 1367, the litigants
179. Id. at 555 (noting that the holding in Aldinger did not require an express authorization for
supplemental jurisdiction to be exercised over the additional defendant, but that a court had to
determine if Congress impliedly or expressly denied the court the use of its constitutional power to
hear such a supplemental claim).
180. Id. at 556.
181. Id.at556-57.
182. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806); Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973);
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989)).
183. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 557; see supra Part IV.
and "all courts . . . agree that § 1367 overturned the result in Finley."'184
While noting the agreement, Justice Kennedy stresses that just as statutes
should not be given "a more expansive interpretation than their text warrants
... that it is just as important not to adopt an artificial construction that is
narrower than what the text provides."181
Justice Kennedy analyzes § 1367 by subsection, starting with §
1367(a). 186  He describes § 1367(a) as a "broad grant of supplemental
jurisdiction over other claims within the same case or controversy, as long as
the action is one in which the district courts would have original
jurisdiction."' 187 He also states that the last sentence of § 1367(a) clearly
establishes that "supplemental jurisdiction extends to claims involving
joinder or intervention of additional parties."' 88  Further, he argues that
because it is undisputed that the additional claims, in the cases before the
Court, constitute the same "case or controversy" within the meaning of §
1367, the mere fact that the independently insufficient claims require the
addition of parties does not, in and of itself, violate § 1367(a) because the
last sentence allows for additional parties.' 89 For these reasons, Justice
Kennedy explains, the only real question before the Court is "whether a
diversity case in which the claims of some plaintiffs satisfy the amount-in-
controversy requirement, but the claims of other plaintiffs do not, presents a
'civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction.'"" 90
Justice Kennedy answers this question in the affirmative.' 9' He argues
that as long as there is one claim which meets all the jurisdictional
requirements, including the amount-in-controversy, that a federal court has
jurisdiction over that claim, regardless of other defective claims. 192
Therefore, "[i]f the court has original jurisdiction over a single claim in the
complaint, it has original jurisdiction over a 'civil action' within the
meaning of § 1367(a)."' ' According to Justice Kennedy, once a court has
found one claim over which it has original jurisdiction, it can then turn to the
184. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 558.
185. Id. Justice Kennedy states that § 1367 "must [be] examine[d] . . . in light of context,
structure, and related statutory provisions." Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2002)).
191. Id. at 558-59 (admitting that "[i]f the answer is no, § 1367 is inapplicable and, in light of our
holdings in Clark and Zahn, the district court has no statutory basis for exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over the additional claims").
192. Id. at 559.
193. Id. (dismissing the notion that because the civil action over which the federal court has
original jurisdiction does not include all of the claims in the complaint that it is not a "civil action"
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).
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rest of subsection 1367(a) and the other subsections of § 1367 to determine
if exercising supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate. 19 4
Satisfied that both cases before the Court represent a "civil action"
within the meaning of § 1367(a), Justice Kennedy strengthens his argument
that § 1367(a) is a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction. 195 He does this
by pointing to the blanket reference the statute makes to supplemental
jurisdiction and that "[n]othing in § 1367 indicates a congressional intent to
recognize, preserve, or create some meaningful, substantive distinction
between the jurisdictional categories we have historically labeled pendent
and ancillary." 196
Justice Kennedy, following the statutory structure, next turns to §
1367(b) to determine if any of the exceptions found within would prevent a
federal court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the claims
which are otherwise included in § 1367(a)'s grant of jurisdiction.19 7
Although the exceptions found in § 1367(b) pertain to causes of action in
which original jurisdiction is based on diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 (as
the cases before the Court in this instance are), Justice Kennedy finds that
"[n]othing in the text of § 1367(b) ... withholds supplemental jurisdiction
over the claims of plaintiffs permissively joined under Rule 20 (like the
additional plaintiffs in [Allapattah]) or certified as class-action members
pursuant to Rule 23 (like the additional plaintiffs in [Ortega])." 19
c. Neologism Du Jour: Indivisibility Theory and Contamination
Theory
After determining that § 1367 provides the statutory authority to assert
supplemental jurisdiction over the additional plaintiffs in the consolidated
cases, Justice Kennedy turns his attention to the alternative view of
the dissent and others that a "civil action" as used in § 1367(a) refers
194. Id. at 559.
195. Id.
196. Id. Justice Kennedy also attempts to minimize the importance of the distinction in the
Court's jurisprudence by asserting that although "the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
developed separately as a historical matter, the Court has recognized that the doctrines are 'two
species of the same generic problem."' Id. (quoting Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U.S. 365, 370 (1978)). Justice Kennedy did not discuss the other limitations on § 1367(a)'s broad
grant of supplemental jurisdiction because he found them to be inapplicable to the question before
the Court. Id. at 557-58.
197. Id. at 560.
198. Id.
to "every claim in the complaint."' 99 Justice Kennedy is of the opinion that
this position:
requires assuming either that all claims in the complaint must stand
or fall as a single, indivisible "civil action" [to be] refer[red] to as
the "indivisibility theory" . . . or ... that the inclusion of a claim or
party falling outside the district court's original jurisdiction
somehow contaminates every other claim in the complaint [to be]..
. refer[red] to as the "contamination theory."' 200
Justice Kennedy quickly dismisses the "indivisibility theory" as being
incongruent with the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. 20 1  He admits,
however, that the "contamination theory" does have some validity in the
"special context of the complete diversity requirement" because if a
nondiverse party is allowed to join the lawsuit this would destroy the
purpose of "providing a federal forum., 20 2  Except for protecting the
rationale behind diversity jurisdiction with respect to nondiverse parties,
Justice Kennedy fails to see the logical relevance of the "contamination
theory" to the amount-in-controversy requirement, because he does not find
an "inherent logical connection between the amount-in-controversy
requirement and § 1332 diversity jurisdiction., 203
199. Id. (stating that this definition of a "civil action" is "urged by some of the parties,
commentators, and Courts of Appeals").
200. Id.
201. Id. at 561. For example, Justice Kennedy assails the "indivisibility theory" as forcing such a
narrow construction that it would not even allow pendent-claims as defined in Gibbs because in that
case "there was no civil action of which the district court could assume original jurisdiction under §
1331 [because of the independently insufficient state claim], and so no basis for exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over any of the claims." Id. Another problem that Justice Kennedy finds
with the "indivisibility theory" is that it is incompatible with the Court's prior practice of only
dismissing those claims which do not independently meet the federal jurisdiction requirements
instead of "dismissing the entire action." Id. (citing Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590
(1939)). Justice Kennedy argues that if the presence of the defective claims do in fact prevent a
federal court from asserting original jurisdiction over the "indivisible civil action before it, then the
district court would have to dismiss the whole action rather than particular parties." Id. Finally,
Justice Kennedy is "unconvinc[ed]" that the "indivisibility theory" should apply to diversity
jurisdiction but not federal-question. Id. This objection to the "indivisibility theory" is based on
Justice Kennedy's belief that the opposing view defines original jurisdiction over a civil action
differently for § 1331 ("original jurisdiction in all actions where at least one claim in the complaint
meets the ... requirements") and § 1332 ("original jurisdiction in all actions where every claim in
the complaint meets the . . . requirements") and that there is no compelling reason to give two
separate meanings to the same words. Id. (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 562 (noting that the "presence of a single nondiverse party may eliminate the fear of
bias with respect to all claims"). Note that when Justice Kennedy refers to a "nondiverse party" he
means that the party would destroy the complete diversity of citizenship of the parties. Id. at 552.
203. Id. at 562. Justice Kennedy explains that the purpose of the amount-in-controversy
requirement is to insure that cases that come before the federal court are not inconsequential and that
he fails to see how allowing a smaller additional claim would diminish the overall financial
importance of the case because the case would already include a claim which independently met the
amount-in-controversy requirement. Id. Justice Kennedy adds further support to his contention that
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Justice Kennedy not only has difficulty with the theories, as defined by
him, underlying the alternative view of § 1367, but he views the argument as
analogous to an argument that was rejected by the Court in City of Chicago
v. International College of Surgeons.2°4 The plaintiff in International
College challenged the removal of his case, which included a federal claim
and a state-law claim with no independent basis for federal jurisdiction, from
state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).20 5 One of the plaintiff's
arguments centered on the fact that the state-law claim did not independently
come within federal jurisdiction and, therefore, the entire "civil action"
could not be removed to federal court regardless of the federal claim.20 6
Justice Kennedy notes that the Court found this argument unpersuasive, that
the state-law claim did not affect the status of the federal claim as a "civil
action" over which a federal court had "original jurisdiction" and that the
district court, after removal of the federal claim, exercised supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.207 Translating
the reasoning of International College to the case at hand, Justice Kennedy
believes that the term "civil action" does not require that every claim
asserted meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, even if the
insufficient claim requires an additional party (so long as that party does not
destroy diversity of citizenship).20 8
Finally, Justice Kennedy addresses the argument that the Court's
interpretation of § 1367(a) leads to anomalous results with respect to the
exceptions found in § 1367(b).2 0 9  The anomaly would be that § 1367(b)
prevents Rule 19 plaintiffs, who are "indispensable," from joining if they do
not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, but allows permissive
there is no logical connection between the amount-in-controversy requirement and § 1332 diversity
jurisdiction by recalling that federal-question jurisdiction once had an amount-in-controversy
requirement. Id. On a related point, Justice Kennedy argues that since both sides agree that § 1367
grants supplemental jurisdiction to related claims when at least one claim independently meets the
federal-question requirements, if the amount-in-controversy requirement were added back to § 133 1,
under § 1367 a federal court could have supplemental jurisdiction over claims that did not meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement so long as there was one federal-question claim that did. Id.
This result means that Clark has been "unambiguously" overruled and, because the reasoning in
Zahn is based heavily on Clark, it would be difficult to "say that § 1367 did not also overrule Zahn."
Id.
204. 522 U.S. 156(1997).
205. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 562-63; see International College, 522 U.S. at 162-65; see also 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000) ("any civil action ... of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court..
206. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 563.
207. Id. (citing International College, 522 U.S. at 166).
208. Id. at 564-65.
209. Id. at 565.
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joinder of plaintiffs under Rule 20, who are not indispensable.2" 0 Justice
Kennedy does not consider this anomaly important and, further, he asserts
that the alternative view would lead to an anomalous result as well.211
Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, the anomaly argument cuts both
ways and does little to weaken the Court's opinion or strengthen that of the
dissent.21 2 Left unswayed by the alternative view, Justice Kennedy makes it
clear that "§ 1367 by its plain text overruled Clark and Zahn. 213
d. The Legislative History is Murky at Best
Justice Kennedy also addresses the legislative history, although not
pertinent to his main point, due to Justice Stevens' reliance on it in his
dissenting opinion and Justice Ginsburg's use of it to add credence to her
statutory interpretation.21 4 Even though the House Report contains language
indicating that § 1367 was not intended to overrule Zahn, Justice Kennedy
points to conflicting statements in the Federal Court Study Committee
Subcommittee's Report with respect to a proposal that had substantially
similar language to § 1367.21 5 Additionally, Justice Kennedy expresses a
general concern that giving legislative history too much weight will allow
non-democratically elected special interests to shape and mold the effect of
legislation simply by affecting the legislative history.216 Ultimately, Justice
Kennedy determines that the legislative history is exceptionally murky and
that even if it were appropriate to look to the legislative history in this case,
that it does not deserve much weight.21 7
210. Id. at 566; see FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b); FED R. Civ. P.20(a).
211. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 566. Justice Kennedy argues that if the alternative view were to be
used, every claim under diversity jurisdiction would have to meet every requirement of diversity
jurisdiction, and the inclusion of Rule 19 plaintiffs in the § 1367(b) list of exceptions to
supplemental jurisdiction would be redundant and anomalous because they would already be
excluded by § 1367(a). Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 567.
215. Id. at 567-71.
216. Id. Justice Kennedy cites Rowe, Jr., Burbank & Mengler, supra note 16, at 960-61 n.90 as
evidence of the fulfillment of the fear that reliance on "legislative history will be used to circumvent
the Article I process." Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 570. Justice Kennedy states that the authors of the
article were involved in the drafting of § 1367 and, in their article, "were frank to concede that if one
refuses to consider the legislative history, one has no choice but to 'conclude that section 1367 has
wiped Zahn off the books."' Id. (quoting Rowe, Jr., Burbank & Mengler, supra note 16, at 960
n.90). Justice Kennedy sees this language as an admission by the authors that the "plain text of §
1367 overruled Zahn and that language to the contrary in the House Report was apost hoe attempt to
alter that result." Id.
217. Id. at 571. Justice Kennedy reinforces throughout this portion of the opinion that he finds the
language of § 1367 unambiguous and, therefore, the resort to legislative history unnecessary. Id. at
567-570.
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e. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)
Justice Kennedy makes it clear that CAFA 21 8 does not affect the Court's
interpretation of § 1367 because it does not apply retroactively to the
consolidated cases before the Court and "the views of the 2005 Congress are
not relevant to [the] interpretation of a text enacted by Congress in 1990.,,219
Additionally, he states that cases that fall within § 1367 do not necessarily
meet CAFA's $5 million dollar requirement to abrogate the no-aggregation
rule of Zahn.220 For these reasons, Justice Kennedy claims that the Court's
holding in Exxon Mobil is still significant because it will affect future cases,
including class actions, which do not meet CAFA's requirements.221
2. Critique of Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
"What is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate
against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the
effect of the language it adopts. 222 These are the words the Court itself
spoke when it reached its holding in Finley.223  In Exxon Mobil, Justice
Kennedy, in an effort to simplify his analysis of the alternative view of §
1367, defines two "theories" which he determines the alternative approach
must use as a basis for its rationale.224 One of the problems with this
approach is that it oversimplifies the argument of the alternative view and
puts words in the mouths of its proponents. 22' The main argument of the
proponents of the alternative view is that Congress intended, through §
1367, to freeze the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction (including
their application to diversity jurisdiction cases), in essence the
"background," as it existed prior to Finley.22 6 After all, the "background"
218. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, S. 5, 109'h Cong. § 4(a)-(b) (2005) [hereinafter CAFA].
CAFA inserted into § 1332 language which allows a district court to exercise jurisdiction over a
class action when there is minimum diversity, there are 100 or more plaintiffs, and the aggregated
amount-in-controversy of all the claims is greater than $5,000,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
219. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 572.
220. Id. at 571-72.
221. Id.
222. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (emphasis added).
223. Id.
224. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 559-60.
225. Id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (making no mention of the "indivisibility theory" or
"contamination theory"). See generally Pfander, supra note 16 (relying on the history of the Court's
diversity, pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and making no mention of either "theory"); Rowe, Jr.,
Burbank & Mengler, supra note 16 (citing the legislative history as the support for their opinion that
Zahn has not been overruled).
226. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 579-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Pfander, supra note 16,
which Congress legislated against in 1990 did not include the terms
"indivisibility theory" or "contamination theory" when describing the
requirements of what constituted "original jurisdiction" over a "civil
action.' '2 27 In fact, the holding in Zahn v. International Paper Co. makes no
mention of either of these so-called theories.228 The history of diversity,
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction is complex and cannot be distilled down to
one theory. 229 The "indivisibility theory" and "contamination theory" both
contradict the reasoning and result in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, yet, under
the alternative approach to § 1367, such a result would be part of the
"background" that has been frozen by the statute to determine when a
federal court has "original jurisdiction., 230
Other criticisms that could be leveled against Justice Kennedy's opinion
are ones that are leveled at the textualist approach in general.3 One of
these criticisms is that the textualist approach will actually lead to a greater
expansion of judicial discretion in determining the meaning of a statute
because the reason that Congress makes the legislative history available is
for the purpose of aiding interpretation.232  Therefore, to ignore the
legislative history is to ignore the will of Congress. 233 Specific criticisms of
at 134 ("the sympathetic reading preserves the rules of complete diversity and aggregation that the
Court had developed in the course of construing section 1332 [and] leaves in place a distinction
between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that had grown up in prior cases. As we have seen, the
pre-Finley decisions steadfastly refused to apply pendent jurisdiction concepts to diversity matters.
Rather, the established body of law governing complete-diversity and aggregation continued to
govern the plaintiffs initial assertion of claims").
227. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 560-61. See generally Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U.S. 365 (1978), Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-
40 (1969), Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
228. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 299-302 (reasoning that the Court's no-aggregation rule predated any
changes to Rule 23 because it was based on the federal diversity jurisdiction statute, as codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1332 and, therefore to have jurisdiction over a claim, each claim must meet the amount-in-
controversy requirement of § 1332 in accordance with the no-aggregation rule that the Court had
read into the amount-in-controversy requirement). But see id. at 305-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court mechanically applied the no-aggregation rule and effectively ignored the
possibility of applying ancillary jurisdiction and noting that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
would be highly appropriate in a case such as Zahn).
229. See supra Parts II & III; see also Freer, supra note 77, at 445 (noting that beginning with
Gibbs the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction was becoming "somewhat less confusing" (emphasis
added)).
230. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 566. But see id. at 577-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that §
1367 only overruled Finley and left pre-Finley jurisprudence intact; this impliedly includes Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur). See also id. at 573-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the House Report as
supporting the conclusion that Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur was meant to survive the passage of 28
U.S.C. § 1367).
231. See id. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the term "'ambiguity' is a term that may
have different meanings for different judges [and b]ecause ambiguity is apparently in the eye of the
beholder, I remain convinced that it is unwise to treat the ambiguity.., as determinative of whether
legislative history is consulted").
232. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes
in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 303-08 (1990).
233. Id. (arguing that words such as "reasonable" and "consistent" as utilized by textualists lend
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the textualist approach that are particularly applicable here are the
"unfairness of change" argument and the argument that courts should be
more responsive to looking at the legislative history when the plain meaning
of the text of the statute is contradicted or inconsistent with the legislative
history.3 The critics of textualism might consider the application of the
textualist approach in this instance as unfair because when the statute was
passed in 1990, it was a period of time in which the majority of Supreme
Court's statutory interpretation cases used the legislative history to some
extent. Additionally, critics of textualism would be troubled by Justice
Kennedy's lack of concern for the contradiction between the Court's
interpretation and the House Report.2 36 This final criticism is the weakest
because the ambiguity of the entire legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is
an open question and will be discussed further with respect to Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion.
themselves to replacing the beliefs of the judge over that of the Congress and that the legislative
history should be given deference in determining the meaning of a statute passed by Congress
because the "legislative history, in the form of committee reports, hearings, and floor remarks is
available to courts because Congress has made those documents available to [them]").
234. See Stephen Breyer, Lecture, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, in
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 850-52, 871-73 (1992) (arguing that use of legislative history is necessary
because: (1) legislative history can "illuminate drafting errors" from otherwise plain text which, if its
commonplace meaning was applied there would be no "absurd" result; (2) legislative history
provides the proper background as to the statute's purpose which aids in determining the meaning of
the text; and (3) in the past the Court has relied heavily on legislative history and it would be unfair
"[t]o change interpretive horses in midstream" because it "would defeat the expectations of the
legislators who enacted a statute..."); see also Wald, supra note 232, at 300-02 (expressing the
opinion that judges should determine if the interpretation of the plain text of the statute conforms or
contradicts the legislative history and that judges should "worry ... when it contradicts the text");
Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453 n.9 (1989) (criticizing Justice
Kennedy's opinion concurring in the judgment that the interpretation of the plain text of the statute
must be "absurd" before using the legislative history and asserting that the "Court has never adopted
so strict a standard for reviewing committee reports, floor debates, and other nonstatutory indications
of congressional intent, and we explicitly reject that standard today").
235. See Wald, supra note 232, at 287-90 (cataloging the "use of legislative history in opinions
throughout the 1988-89 [Supreme Court] Term" and determining that in "almost three-fourths of
those [cases] involving statutory construction and over one-third of all the opinions of the Court-
legislative history was relied upon in a substantive way to reach the Court's decision"); see also
Breyer, supra note 234, at 872 (arguing that "[w]hen legislators enact statutes against the backdrop
of current judicial practice, they know that they need not spend scarce time entering thorny,
technical, legal debates about language when all concerned agree about substance").
236. See Wald, supra note 232, at 300-02; see also Breyer, supra note 234, at 856 (opining that
adoption of a literal interpretation that is inconsistent with the legislative history "denies the public a
significant part of the benefit of [the] expertise [of] individuals and groups" who contribute to the
creation of the legislation and whose opinions are found within the legislative history); Jacobs v.
Bremner, 378 F. Supp. 2d 861, 865 & n.4 (N.D. 11. 2005) (criticizing the Court's decision in Exxon
Mobil for ignoring what Judge Shadur felt was a clear and unambiguous contradiction found in the
House Report).
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3. Analysis of Justice Stevens' Opinion
While Justice Stevens begins his opinion by making it clear that he
agrees with the reasoning in Justice Ginsburg's dissent regarding the
interpretation of the text of the statute, his dissent centers mostly on the
Court's refusal to consider the legislative history in interpreting the
statute.237  Justice Stevens is not persuaded by the majority's
characterization of § 1367 as unambiguous. 238  Additionally, he does not
agree that ambiguity alone should determine whether or not the legislative
history is consulted and he attacks the majority's characterization of the
legislative history as murky or unreliable, describing it as a "virtual billboard
of congressional intent.,
239
Justice Stevens attacks the majority's reasoning by stating that its use of
the Subcommittee Report was overreaching because the report was never
adopted by the FCSC. 240  In addition, he argues that the fact that the
Subcommittee Report came to a different conclusion than the House Report,
regarding language substantially similar to § 1367, is additional proof that §
1367 is ambiguous.241 Justice Stevens also finds the Court's analysis of the
article written by "three law professors who participated in drafting § 1367"
to be inappropriate and a mischaracterization.242
Finally, Justice Stevens lobs one last volley against the Court's opinion.
He summarizes his dissatisfaction with defining § 1367 as unambiguous,
and concludes that § 1367 does not overrule Zahn or Clark because of
Justice Ginsburg's "persuasive account of the statutory text and its
jurisprudential backdrop, and given the uncommonly clear legislative history
91243
237. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 572-75 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
238. Id. at 572.
239. Id. at 575. Justice Stevens believes that "ambiguity is ... in the eye of the beholder" and the
fact that Justice Ginsburg can make such a well reasoned argument that the statute has another
meaning is, in and of itself, evidence of ambiguity. Id. Justice Stevens is also incredulous of the
Court's characterization of the legislative history as murky, and states that "[i]n Congress,
committee reports are normally considered the authoritative explication of a statute's text and
purpose, and busy legislators and their assistants rely on that explication in casting their votes." Id.
(citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984)).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 576 (referring to the Court's discussion of Rowe, Jr., Burbank & Mengler, supra note
16, at 943, and that in Justice Stevens opinion "the professors were merely saying that the text of the
statute was susceptible to an overly broad (and simplistic) reading, and that clarification in the House
Report was therefore appropriate").
243. Id. at 577 (emphasis added) (implying that "[a]ifter nearly 20 pages of complicated analysis,
which explores subtle doctrinal nuances and coins various neologisms" the Court is disingenuous
when it describes § 1367 as unambiguous).
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4. Critique of Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens' main disagreement with Justice Kennedy's opinion,
other than his support for Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion, is Justice
Kennedy's failure to follow the "virtual billboard of congressional intent"
found in the legislative history.244 However, most of what Justice Stevens
points to in support of his "billboard" analogy is found in the House Report
and is without direct support in the FCSC Report and contradicted in the
Subcommittee Report.245 The problem with his sole reliance on the House
Report and his criticism of Justice Kennedy's use of the Subcommittee
Report is that it seems to be an artificial limitation of what constitutes
"legislative history." 246 Additionally, Justice Stevens seems to want it both
ways. The Court cannot use the Subcommittee Report to show the
ambiguity of the legislative history, but he can use it to show the ambiguity
of the statute. 47 The reasoning of this result is unclear.
244. Id. at 575.
245. See id. at 573-74 (supporting his analogy by quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-734 at 29 & n.17
which states that "section [1367] is not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to
Finley,"; following this quote is a footnote which cites both Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur and Zahn);
see FCSC Report, supra note 18, at 47-48 (the only section of the FCSC Report referring to
supplemental jurisdiction and not taking a stance on the effect of the statute on Zahn); see
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at 561 n.33 (noting that the language of the proposed
statute, which is very similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, "would overrule the Supreme Court's decision in"
Zahn). The language of the proposed supplemental jurisdiction statute in the Subcommittee Report
states in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or in another provision of this Title, in
any civil action on a claim for which jurisdiction is provided, the district court shall have
jurisdiction over all other claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,
including claims that require the joinder of additional parties.
(b) In civil actions under § 1332 of this Title, jurisdiction shall not extend to claims by
the plaintiff against parties joined under Rules 14 and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or to claims by parties who intervene under Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, provided, that the court may hear such claims if necessary to prevent
substantial prejudice to a party or third-party.
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at 567-68.
246. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-54 n.9 (1989) (listing
as legislative history "committee reports, floor debates, and other nonstatutory indications of
congressional intent"); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 836-37 (1991) (including "talk on
the floor of legislatures, or ... committee meetings" among the various types of legislative history);
Wald, supra note 232, at 306 (describing legislative history as including "committee reports,
hearings, and floor remarks"); Breyer, supra note 234, at 845, 864 (listing as types of legislative
history, "congressional floor debates, committee reports, hearing testimony, and presidential
messages" and that legislators generally do "not distinguish between different kinds of documents").
247. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Subcommittee Report
"only highlights the fact that the statute is ambiguous").
Justice Stevens also criticizes Justice Kennedy's use of a law review
article written by "three law professors who participated in drafting § 1367"
to show that the legislative history is unreliable.24 8 Justice Stevens believes
that the law professors, in their article, were simply making the point that
"the statute was susceptible to an overly broad (and simplistic) reading, and
that clarification in the House Report was therefore appropriate., 249 The
language quoted by Justice Kennedy, however, is a clear fulfillment of the
fear that the legislative history can be manipulated to achieve a result
contrary to the plain language of the statute; how else can the following
sentence be explained?
It would have been better had the statute dealt explicitly with this
problem, and the legislative history was an attempt to correct the
oversight. The resulting combination of statutory language and
legislative history, however, creates the delicious possibility that
despite Justice Scalia's opposition to the use of legislative history,
he will have to look to the history or conclude that section 1367 has
wiped Zahn off the books.50
The use by Justice Stevens of the phrase "merely saying" to minimize
the preceding passage does little to change the message: that some of those
involved in drafting § 1367 did not like the product of the legislative
process, the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and decided to "fix" the result by
adding legislative history.25
5. Analysis of Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg begins her dissent with a summary of the diversity and
supplemental jurisdiction case law that lead to the passage of 28 U.S.C. §
1367, a summary not materially different from the majority's. 2 52 Finding the
Court's interpretation of § 1367 to be "plausibl[e]" but also "broad," Justice
Ginsburg suggests "another plausible reading" that is "less disruptive of [the
Court's] jurisprudence regarding supplemental jurisdiction. '253  The
"narrower construction," according to Justice Ginsburg, "reads § 1367(a) to
instruct... that the district court must first have 'original jurisdiction' over a
'civil action' before supplemental jurisdiction can attach" and that such a
reading preserves "Clark and Zahn" preventing the "joinder of plaintiffs, or
248. Id. at 576.
249. Id.
250. Rowe, Jr., Burbank & Mengler, supra note 16, at 960 n.90 (emphasis added).
251. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 576.
252. Id. at 577-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 579.
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inclusion of class members, who do not independently meet the amount-in-
controversy requirement.
254
After describing her construction of § 1367, Justice Ginsburg describes
the nuances of, and differences between, the development of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction. 55 Justice Ginsburg then describes: (1) the formation
of the FCSC; (2) the Subcommittee Report; (3) that the FCSC Report made
no mention of overruling Zahn; and (4) that the House Report characterized
the recommended statute as "modest" and "noncontroversial. 25 6
Justice Ginsburg believes that to apply § 1367 properly, it must be
understood that the statute "operates only in civil actions 'of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction"' and, therefore, it is important to
determine when a federal court has original jurisdiction over a civil
action.2 57  Essentially, Justice Ginsburg believes that the phrase "original
jurisdiction" in § 1367(a) requires a different analysis depending on which
statute confers jurisdiction over the action (i.e. diversity or federal-
question). 258 For this reason, she believes that past jurisprudence, like Zahn,
must be consulted to determine if, under § 1367(a), a federal court has
"original jurisdiction" over the "civil action" when such original jurisdiction
is based on the diversity jurisdiction statute.259
a. Justice Ginsburg Focuses on the No-Aggregation Rule
Justice Ginsburg, in an effort to explain why § 1367 does not allow the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in the consolidated cases, gives her
own summation of the requirements of diversity jurisdiction.260 With
254. Id. (describing the "narrower construction" as "better" than the construction of § 1367 by the
Court).
255. Id. at 579-82. Justice Ginsburg's summary of pendent jurisdiction is very similar to that of
the Court. Id. at 580. However, Justice Ginsburg spends much more time explaining the
development of ancillary jurisdiction and the rationale on which the doctrine is based. See id. at 581.
Justice Ginsburg uses Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), to illustrate
the limitations that had developed around the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction and that one of the
primary concerns surrounding the doctrine was preventing plaintiffs from circumventing diversity
jurisdiction requirements and that "throughout the litigation, all plaintiffs must remain diverse from
all defendants." Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 582 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Owen, 437 U.S. at
374).
256. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 583-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (contrasting Congress' passage of
§ 1367 with its failure to implement the "immodest proposal" of the FCSC to eliminate diversity
jurisdiction).
257. Id. at 584.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 584-87 Justice Ginsburg's explanation of the "complete diversity" rule is similar to
that of the Court, however, she goes on to emphasize that the Court has held that as a requirement
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respect to the amount-in-controversy requirement Justice Ginsburg states
that the Court's jurisprudence stands for the proposition that "a single
plaintiff may aggregate two or more claims against a single defendant [to
meet the amount-in-controversy requirement] . . . [b]ut in multiparty cases,
including class actions, [the Court has] unyieldingly adhered to the
nonaggregation rule stated in Troy Bank., 261 Justice Ginsburg is troubled by
what she views as the Court's description of the "complete diversity"
requirement as more important than the amount-in-controversy
requirement.262 She fails to see what "allows the Court to slice up § 1332"
to not allow claims that violate the "complete diversity" requirement but
allow those claims that do not meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement.2 63 In support of her view that the "complete diversity" and
amount-in-controversy requirements should not be treated differently, she
points to the fact that the Court has cured both jurisdictional defects the
same way, by dismissing the independently insufficient claim.264 Regardless
of the Court's decision in the present case to treat the two requirements of
diversity jurisdiction differently, Justice Ginsburg asserts that prior to the
passage of § 1367, "[t]he rule that each plaintiff must independently satisfy
the amount-in-controversy requirement, unless Congress expressly orders
otherwise, was.., the solidly established reading of § 1332. "265
b. § 1367, No-Aggregation & "Original Jurisdiction"
Justice Ginsburg further refines her argument by acknowledging that the
"complete diversity" requirement is not at issue in the present cases and that
"the question [is] whether Congress abrogated the nonaggregation rule long
tied to § 1332 when it enacted § 1367. ",266 According to Justice Ginsburg,
the Court should presume that Congress enacted § 1367 "against a
background of law already in place and the historical development of that
law" and that the Court regularly engages in such an interpretive
presumption.26 7
Just as Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg finds no disagreement
regarding the effect of § 1367(a) "to permit pendent-party jurisdiction in
federal-question cases, and thus, to overrule Finley.' '2 68 Therefore, her main
for diversity jurisdiction "each plaintiff's stake must independently meet the amount-in-controversy"
requirement. Id. at 585 (citing Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911)).
261. Id. at 585-86 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589
(1939); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969)).
262. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 586 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 586-87.
266. Id. at 587.
267. Id. (citing Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 169 (2004)).
268. Id. at 587.
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disagreement with the majority centers on § 1367(a)'s impact on § 1332
diversity cases.269 She believes that there is nothing to indicate that the no-
aggregation rule has been rejected by Congress. 270 For this reason, Justice
Ginsburg finds that the term "original jurisdiction" as a matter of
jurisprudence contains the no-aggregation rule and because the no-
aggregation rule requires each individual plaintiff to meet the amount-in-
controversy, Zahn is not overruled by § 1367(a). 7'
c. The Anomaly
Justice Ginsburg finds that the alternative approach espoused by the
Court leads to the anomalous result of not allowing supplemental
jurisdiction over Rule 19 plaintiffs who are indispensable parties but allows
Rule 20 permissive plaintiffs.2 72 Justice Ginsburg then tackles the issue of
what the purpose of § 1367(b) is under her interpretive scheme.273 She
explains that § 1367(b) does not include Rule 20 or 23 plaintiffs because
they are already precluded by § 1367(a).274 According to Justice Ginsburg's
interpretation, the other exceptions are listed to safeguard against any
temptation of the federal courts to expand the accommodation of ancillary
claims in a way that alters § 1332's requirements, even though § 1367(a)
maintains the distinctions between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.273
269. Id. at 587-88.
270. Id. at 587-90.
271. Id. Justice Ginsburg does not only find her interpretation better than the alternative because
she believes that it is less disruptive to the Court's diversity jurisdiction jurisprudence, but she also
believes that it retains more of the distinctions between the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction. Id. at 590-91. She believes the retention of the distinction (which in her opinion the
Court rejects) is better because then the only effect of the statute would be to overrule Finley, which
all agree was the main purpose of § 1367. Id. at 590 & n.10. Additionally, Justice Ginsburg
mentions that "[tihe point of the Court's extended discussion of Chicago v. International College of
Surgeons ... slips from [her] grasp" because there is no disagreement as to whether § 1367(a) can be
used to "exercise ... supplemental jurisdiction in removed cases." Id. at 592 n. 11. Further, she
believes that her approach to § 1367 "would ... synchronize § 1367 with the removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1441" because "the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1441 to prohibit removal unless the
entire action, as it stands at the time of removal, could have been filed in federal court in the first
instance." Id. at 591-92 & n.l 1 (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 589 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to the same anomaly that Justice Kennedy
admitted that his approach would create, that Rule 19 plaintiffs who are indispensable parties could
not have supplemental jurisdiction exercised over their claims but a court could exercise jurisdiction
over permissive (unnecessary) parties joined under Rule 20).




d. The Class Action Fairness Act of2005 (CAFA)
Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg does not find the passage of
CAFA irrelevant to the analysis at hand. 7 6 In fact, because CAFA directly
amends § 1332, Justice Ginsburg sees CAFA as evidence that if Congress
intended to change the well established jurisprudence of § 1332, that it
would have done so directly-not through the backdoor of § 1367.77
Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg concludes that § 1367 does not overrule
Clark or Zahn.27 8 In addition, even though the legislative history was not
necessary to her interpretation of the statute, because the legislative history
is "corroborative of [her] statutory reading" she is confident that the Court
should have adopted her analysis. 79
6. Critique of Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg's interpretation is heavily based on the assumption that
all Congress intended to do by passing 28 U.S.C. § 1367 was to overrule
Finley and essentially restore pre-Finley jurisprudence 8 ° This assumption
is central to Justice Ginsburg's interpretation because once this assumption
is made, then the phrases "original jurisdiction" and "civil action" acquire
the meanings of pre-Finley jurisprudence, which includes Zahn. The main
problem with this assumption is that it assumes that Congress could freeze
time and evolving judicial doctrines.
In Zahn, the Court only looked to support supplemental jurisdiction
through the diversity statute. There was no supplemental jurisdiction statute
to speak of and, therefore, no other statutory basis for the insufficient claims
except for § 1332.81 Similarly, the Court in Finley dismissed a
jurisdictionally insufficient claim against an additional defendant because
the Federal Torts Claim Act upon which federal jurisdiction was based did
not include any allowance for supplemental jurisdiction.8 2 Not only does
the reasoning of the two cases seem parallel, but the Court in Finley
expressly states a connection between the result in Finley and the holding in
Zahn: "All our cases-Zahn, Aldinger, and Kroger-have held that a grant
of jurisdiction over claims involving particular parties does not itself confer
jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different parties. Our
276. Id. at 595 n.12.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 595 n.14.
280. Id. at 579, 584-89.
281. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 299 (1973); see also id. at 305 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not have only applied the requirements of § 1332 but
should have also considered whether or not to allow ancillary jurisdiction to be exercised over the
insufficient claims).
282. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1989).
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decision today reaffirms that interpretative rule. 283  In other words, the
reasoning behind the holding in Finley is the reasoning behind the holding in
Zahn. It is incongruous to say that the exact same reasoning is overturned in
one instance and not the other.
The answer that the result is different because original jurisdiction
founded under § 1332 has different requirements than federal-question
jurisdiction is insufficient, though relied upon by Justice Ginsburg.284 In
Zahn, a diversity case, the sufficient claims were not dismissed, the
insufficient ones were dismissed; therefore, the insufficient claims did not
affect the jurisdiction of a federal court over the sufficient claims.285 In
Finley, a federal-question case under FTCA, the sufficient claim was not
dismissed, the insufficient ones were dismissed; therefore, the insufficient
claims did not affect the jurisdiction of the federal court over the sufficient
claims.286 Even with different requirements, it seems that once one claim
meets the jurisdictional requirements, whether in a diversity action, like
Zahn, or in a federal-question, like Finley, the court has jurisdiction over that
claim and, therefore, has jurisdiction over a civil action. 287
Another weakness of Justice Ginsburg's argument is relying on the
characterization of the dismissal of the plaintiff with the insufficient amount-
in-controversy as "[tjhe cure for improper joinder of a plaintiff who does not
satisfy the jurisdictional amount" to "preserve[]" original jurisdiction.
283. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
284. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 592-93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
285. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 302.
286. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
287. It is also curious to note that Justice Ginsburg spends much of her opinion asserting that the
nonaggregation rule is alive and well. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 588-89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
However, the Court never disputes this assertion. Id. at 549-73. In fact, no one is making the
argument that the federal courts have jurisdiction over the insufficient claims under § 1332 or due to
aggregation. Id. As discussed above in the text, Zahn stands for the proposition that when a
jurisdictionally sufficient claim is mixed with claims that are insufficient due to failure to fulfill the
amount-in-controversy, the federal court still has "original jurisdiction" as to that sufficient claim.
Zahn, 490 U.S. at 302. In Zahn, the insufficient claims were dismissed because their was no
independent statutory basis to support them; however, § 1367 is an independent statutory basis and,
there is no doubt that the insufficient class-action plaintiffs' claims are part of the "same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution" and that the sufficient claims
comprise a "civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a). Additionally, Justice Ginsburg's use of a quote from Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-
40 (1969) to show that "abandonment of the nonaggregation rule in class actions would undercut the
congressional 'purpose.. .to check, to some degree, the rising caseload of the federal courts' is
misleading. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 586. The quote is in reference to the argument by the
plaintiffs in Snyder, all of whom had insufficient claims, to allow aggregation of all of their claims to
meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, a much different argument than that put forth in Exxon
Mobil where only unnamed plaintiffs did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement. Id.
288. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 586 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice
877
Using the word "cure" does not mean that the federal court "found" original
jurisdiction in the jurisdictionally sufficient claim where there was none
because it had been magically "cured" by the dismissal of the insufficient
claim. The jurisdiction of the independently sufficient claim was always
present. 28 9  Additionally, it seems that Justice Ginsburg is attempting to
connect the words "cure" and "civil action" in her argument, and that
somehow, to allow the insufficient claim back in would "un-cure" the "civil
action. '' 19  However, the problem with this interpretation of § 1367(a) is that
it substitutes the words "civil action as originally filed" or "the civil action
comprising all of the original claims" for the words of the statute, which
state that § 1367 operates when there is "any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction., 29' Although a district court cannot
exercise original jurisdiction over some of the original claims under § 1332
because the amount-in-controversy requirement is not met, the claims over
which the district court does have jurisdiction is "any civil action" even if it
is not the civil action as originally filed.292 Also, Justice Ginsburg gives too
much weight to the words "civil action," by using those words as criteria to
determine when a federal jurisdiction has "original jurisdiction" under §
1367. The Court in Finley reminds us that the use of the words "civil
action" in most jurisdictional statutes has less to do with expanding or
contracting jurisdiction and has more to do with conformity with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.29 3
Justice Ginsburg also claims that her anomaly, that § 1367(b) is
superfluous, is explainable as an additional safeguard to make sure Kroger
stayed in place (although as a pre-Finley case already included in § 1367(a)
Ginsburg also argues that since jurisdiction is "cured" by dismissing both nondiverse and
insufficient amount-in-controversy plaintiffs, both requirements are the same and, therefore, the
Court was wrong to separate them. Id. The logical connection between the dismissal for
nondiversity or insufficient amount-in-controversy is weak, other than the fact that they are both
requirements of § 1332. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. After all, a nondiverse party destroys the "complete
diversity" of all the claims, while the insufficiency of the amount of the claim only affects that
particular claim; therefore, all the claims in the complaint are "cured" by the nondiverse dismissal
but only the insufficient claim, with respect to the amount-in-controversy, is "cured" by its
dismissal. Compare State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967), with Zahn,
414 U.S. at 302.
289. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 302.
290. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 584-85, 589-90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
291. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added).
292. See id.
293. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554-55 (1989) (explaining that the 1948 recodification
of the Judicial Code "inserted the expression 'civil action' throughout the provisions governing
district-court jurisdiction" and that it was to bring those statutes into conformity with the "Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which provide that '[t]here shall be one form of action to be known as
"civil action"'); see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) ("it is
axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction");
FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."'); FED. R. CIv. P.
82 ("These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district
courts").
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under her reading) and forgivable because "§ 1367's enigmatic text defies
flawless interpretation. ' , 294 However, Justice Ginsburg does not attempt to
explain why her anomaly, that a whole subsection of § 1367 is an
unnecessary safeguard, is superior to Justice Kennedy's anomaly that
Congress omitted Rule 20 plaintiffs from § 1367(b)'s exception but included
Rule 19 plaintiffs. 295 Finally, Justice Ginsburg's argues that the passage of
the Class Action Fairness Act296 strengthens her position because it shows
that when Congress intends to change the jurisdictional requirements of a
statute, that it will do so "clearly and conspicuously., 297 This argument is
flimsy: one could make the same argument for any statute for which § 1367
supplements jurisdiction.298
VI. THE IMPACT OF EXXON MOBIL CORP. V. ALLAPA TTAH SER VICES, INC.
The result of Exxon Mobil is to greatly reduce the difficulty on plaintiffs
to bring suit in federal court. Before Exxon Mobil, plaintiffs with claims
who did not meet the amount-in-controversy had to be dismissed. Now a
federal court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims under
28 U.S.C. § 1367.299 Applying the Court's interpretation of § 1367, there
could be a class action under Rule 23 with a named plaintiff who just meets
the amount-in-controversy requirement ($75,001) and thousands of unnamed
plaintiffs with claims well below the amount-in-controversy ($1, $5, $10,
etc.).3"' In conjunction with Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, where it was
294. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 594 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (happy with the
result that § 1367 produces less disruption of the Court's supplemental jurisdiction jurisprudence).
295. Id. at 565-66. Though it is still unclear to the author how Justice Kennedy could argue that §
1367 is meant to overturn Zahn and Clark and then state that the omission of Rule 20 and 23
plaintiffs is an anomaly. Id. After all, if § 1367 was intended to overrule Zahn and Clark, then
placing Rule 20 and 23 plaintiffs in § 1367(b) would defeat this purpose. Id. Their absence from §
1367(b) confirms Justice Kennedy's interpretation, therefore, his need to justify it with a similar
"double sure" argument regarding the presence of Rule 19 plaintiffs is unclear. Id.
296. See supra note 218.
297. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 594 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
298. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)); Finley v.
United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
299. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 572.
300. Id. This result is not simply theoretical. Two recent cases, a district court case in the
Southern District of New York and a Sixth Circuit appellate case, have applied the Exxon Mobil
interpretation of § 1367 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in situations in which Zahn would have
previously prevented the courts from doing so. See Feinberg v. Katz, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26954,
at *36-*42 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2005) (finding supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of 64 creditor
assignors who did not meet § 1332's amount-in-controversy requirement because six claims did);
see also Engstrom v. Mayfield, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 27854, at *10 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 2005)
(applying § 1367 after the decision in Exxon Mobil and allowing supplemental jurisdiction to be
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decided that unnamed plaintiffs in a class action can be nondiverse, Exxon
Mobil creates a potent weapon for plaintiffs who fail to meet either of the
requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction under § 1332, "complete
diversity" and amount-in-controversy, to find their way into federal court.3"1
Another significant consequence of the Court's decision is that it makes
it easier for a defendant to remove a case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a) in addition to giving the plaintiff more options of where to bring a
cause of action.30 2  Plaintiffs who are careful to include an additional
plaintiff under Rule 20 or 23, whose claim failed to meet the amount-in-
controversy, can no longer avoid the specter of removal. The "propriety of
removal ... depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in
federal court. ' 303  Now that Zahn is no longer an obstacle, once the
jurisdictionally-sufficient plaintiffs are removed to federal district court the
same district court can utilize § 1367(a) to exercise jurisdiction over the
insufficient claims.3°
Finally, the Court's express rejection of the legislative history, even
when it is in direct conflict with the unambiguous statutory text, will have
repercussions beyond § 1367. In fact, it has already begun to affect how
exercised over claims that had the following amounts in controversy: $75,000; $10,000; $8,000;
$7,000; $10,000; and $10,000 because one claim met the amount-in-controversy requirement with
an $80,000 claim).
301. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at
572. However, there still are limits on the supplemental jurisdiction statute's, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
affect on the federal diversity statute requirements, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Reinke v. Bank of Am.,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33400, at *6, *14 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2005) (citing Exxon Mobil for the
proposition that plaintiffs need at least one claim to meet the amount-in-controversy for there to be
original jurisdiction); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Greater Chiropractic Ctr. Corp., 393 F.
Supp. 2d 1317, 1322-23 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (stating that although the Court in Exxon Mobil had
interpreted § 1367(a) to be a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction, § 1367(b) still prevented the
adding of jurisdictionally insufficient claims against defendants joined under Rule 20); Employers
Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13233, at *6-
*7 (W.D. Wis. June 30, 2005) (denying claims against additional defendants because of § 1367(b),
even though plaintiff relied on decision in Exxon Mobil to try to convince district court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (holding that plaintiffs cannot
aggregate individual claims to meet amount-in-controversy requirement, that this nonaggregation
rule was not overturned by the decision in Exxon Mobil and that it still imposes a stumbling block
for parties wishing to get federal jurisdiction over diversity of citizenship claims).
302. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000). See Longo v. Monson, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33401, at *1-*4
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2005) (denying plaintiffs' motion to remand case to state court because one of
the plaintiff's claims met the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy even though the other plaintiff s
claim did not; the district court supported its finding that the case had been properly removed by
relying on Exxon Mobil); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Barnett, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20026, at
*14-*15 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2005) (not to be published) (denying plaintiffs motion for remand to state
court because removal was proper under reasoning in Exxon Mobil).
303. City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997).
304. See id. at 165-66; see also Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 562-63 drawing parallels to the
definition in City of Chicago of what a "civil action" over which a federal district court has "original
jurisdiction" means with respect to federal-question and diversity jurisdiction).
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lower courts interpret statutes and marks a further departure from past
301interpretive practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is often repeated by the justices of the Supreme Court that the federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. While none disagree with this
statement, there are real disagreements as to what the limits are. Prior to the
Court's decision in Finley, the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction, especially after Gibbs, had put the judge in the position of
soothsayer, attempting to divine whether Congress implied, in the various
jurisdictional statutes, that the federal courts could exercise or could not
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The Court in Finley made clear that this
was no longer allowed and that Congress had to expressly authorize a
federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Congress answered by
passing the supplemental jurisdiction statute 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the full effect
of which was finally decided by the Court in Exxon Mobil.
Despite the fears of those who advocated for "sympathetic textualism" it
does not appear that the litigation flood gates have been opened. Further,
now that Congress has passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, it
seems as if the current perception of the national legislature is not that
305. See Davis v. Bailey, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38204, at *13-*15 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2005)
(refusing to look to the legislative history to find a private right of action supported by Section 36(a)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, H.R. 10065, 76th Cong., 54 Stat. 789, 841 (1940), because
not found explicitly stated in the text and supporting this method of interpretation by citing the
Court's decision in Exxon Mobil); Hernandez v. Citifinancial Servs., Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32532, at *17-*19, *21 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2005) (assuming that plaintiff is correct in asserting that
there is a drafting error in 15 U.S.C. § 1681 that denies him a private cause of action, but that so long
as the result is not absurd, because of Court's holding in Exxon Mobil the district court cannot use
legislative history to correct the drafting error); Pietras v. Curfin Oldsmobile, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26510, at *10, *13 (N.D. 11. Nov. 1, 2005) (refusing to look to legislative history to determine if
there is "a private right of action against willful violators of the" Fair Credit Reporting Act.); see
also Consumer Credit Protection Act, S.5, 90th Cong., 82 Stat. 146 (1968); H.R. 3610, 104th Cong.,
110 Stat. 3009-443 to 3009-446 (1996); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, H.R.
2622, 108th Cong., 117 Stat. 1952, 1960 (2003)); Murray v. Household Bank, N.A., 386 F. Supp. 2d
993, 998-99 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (supporting its decision that 15 U.S.C. § 1681m does not provide for a
private right of action because the ruling in Exxon Mobil established that a court cannot look to
legislative history, even if legislative history is in direct opposition to the result of interpreting the
plain text of the statute); Jacobs v. Bremner, 378 F. Supp. 2d 861, 864, 865 n.4, 866 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(refusing to look to legislative history because of the ruling in Exxon Mobil even though the judge
personally agreed with Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in the case); Breyer, supra note 234, at
850 (arguing that legislative history can "illuminate drafting errors" from otherwise plain text which
if its commonplace meaning was applied there would be no "absurd" result); see Wald, supra note
232, at 287-90 (stating that the Supreme Court in its 1988-89 term used legislative history in "almost
three-fourths of those [cases] involving statutory construction and over one-third of all the opinions
of the Court-legislative history was relied upon in a substantive way to reach the Court's decision").
diversity jurisdiction is unimportant, but that it is a useful tool to insure that
both plaintiffs and defendants have ample opportunity to get the fairest
forum possible. The Court's interpretation of § 1367 in Exxon Mobil
conforms with this view as evidenced by lower court holdings that have
allowed plaintiffs to bring their action in federal court and that have allowed
defendants to remove once un-removable cases into what they perceive as a
fairer federal forum.
Finally, Exxon Mobil has impacted more than just questions of federal
jurisdiction. The Court's refusal to consider the legislative history forces
lower courts to apply a more textualist approach to statutory interpretation.
The most recent results have been to deny private right of action to plaintiffs
seeking relief under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Investment
Company Act of 1940. It will be interesting to see if Congress' antennae
have picked up the signal and will begin to place less importance on
explanations in the legislative history as well as what impact this will have
on the different groups who attempt to mold and shape the legislative history
in hopes that the statute will be construed in a light more favorable to them.
Was the Congress of 1990 made up of civil procedure radicals, out on a
rampage to destroy Supreme Court jurisprudence? The answer is no. Their
purpose was to promote fairness and convenience and to give the federal
courts the statutory authority to pursue those goals. The doctrines of
ancillary, pendent, and even diversity jurisdiction are not "sacred cows."
They developed around limits that Congress set by statute (within the
bounds of the Constitution) and can be changed at the determination of
Congress. The plain words of a congressional jurisdiction statute should not
be thwarted simply to avoid "disrupting" the Court's pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction doctrines that developed absent an express statutory basis. The
Court recognized this principal in Exxon Mobil. To have held otherwise
would have been to allow judicial doctrine to trump congressional mandate,
running counter to the mantra that almost every judge recites prior to
deciding a subject matter jurisdiction case, "that the federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction."
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